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Substantive public procurement law is highly harmonized on the EU level1. Furthermore, 
the EU lawmaker has harmonized the procurement remedies system on the EU level as well. 
This has been done by Council Directives 89/665/EEC2 and 92/13/EEC3 as amended by 
Directive 2007/66/EC (hereinafter also the Remedies Directives). As the contents of Directives 
89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC are to large extent identical, this work will not differentiate 
between them unless expressly stated otherwise.  
The Remedies Directives establish the minimum requirements of procurement remedies 
system under EU law, e.g., types of remedies which must be available to persons injured by 
procurement breaches. In 2007, EU procurement remedies system was reformed to significant 
extent – to name a few important additions, compulsory standstill period and remedy of 
ineffectiveness were introduced. As the EU lawmaker has bestowed high importance on 
achieving compliance with EU law at a time when infringements can still be corrected4, the 
2007 amendments were aimed at increasing the effectiveness of pre-contractual remedies5. 
Nevertheless, the post-contractual remedies (i.e., damages and ineffectiveness) still carry 
practical importance as reliance on pre-contractual remedies is not possible in all cases.  
The 2007 reform left the remedy of damages for procurement breaches completely 
unchanged. By virtue of Art. 2(1)(c) of 89/665/EEC and Art. 2(1)(d) of 92/13/EEC, it remains 
a mere requirement that damages remedy must be available for persons harmed by an 
infringement. The EU lawmaker has thus left it under procedural autonomy of Member States 
to “add flesh to the bare provisions”6. The Remedies Directive give some subtle hints about 
possible ways to transpose the procurement damages remedy national laws of Member States. 
For instance, Member States can establish in their national laws that the contested decision must 
be first set aside as a precondition for damages claim7. Those hints are however of minor 
 
1 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of 
concession contracts, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC & Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in water, energy, transport and postal 
services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC.  
2 Council Directive of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts.  
3 Council Directive of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and telecommunications sectors.  
4 A. Reich & O. Shabat. The remedy of damages in public procurement in Israel and the EU: a proposal for reform. 
Public Procurement Law Review, 2014, 2, p 68. 
5 A. J. van Heeswijck. The Dutch system of legal protection in public procurement procedures. Public Procurement 
Law Review, 2015, 6, p 193. 
6 D. Fairgrieve & Licéhre. Public Procurement Law Damages as an Effective Remedy, United Kingdom, Hart 
Publishing Ltd, 2011, p 171 (R. Caranta).  
7 Art. 2(7) of 89/665/EEC & Art. 2(6) of 92/13/EEC.  
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practical importance. The substantive conditions of procurement damages remedy are not 
stipulated in the Remedies Directives. Consequently, there is no uniform understanding of what 
the minimum requirements are to claim damages for procurement breaches under EU law.  
Presumably not entirely coincidentally the main issue with the procurement damages is the 
fact that they are not really available for aggrieved tenderers. That is despite the fact that the 
EU lawmaker has expressly required availability of damages remedy in the Remedies 
Directives. In practical terms, the success rate of procurement damages claims in most Member 
States is slim to none. C. Ginter and M. A. Simovart note that although EU law requirement of 
procurement damages remedy stands unchanged since 1989, “it has not proven a popular nor 
effective remedy for practical purposes”8. According to H. Schebesta “damages claims have 
remained what they were over 20 years ago … a mere theoretical possibility”9.  
The factual unavailability of an effective damages remedy is illustrated by relatively low 
number of damages claims for procurement law breaches across the Member States. P. Trepte 
argues that the lack of practical effect of damages claims in the field of EU procurement is the 
result injured parties’ unwillingness to claim damages since the monetary consequences of such 
actions are unforeseeable10. According to M. Burgi, aggrieved tenderers consider damages 
secondary in effect and thus importance because of severe unlikelihood to achieve the award of 
a “real compensation for lost contract” in most cases. Such result can be attributed to the fact 
that the required standard of proof tends to stand out of reach for the aggrieved tenderers11.  
S. Treumer argues that the limited sources of law on damages is the reason behind the absence 
of an effective damages remedy. National legal systems are unclear on the matter and courts 
usually rely on their national case law on damages which is sometimes not even from 
procurement related field12. 
The lack of practical enforceability of damages claims for procurement breaches does not 
render the remedy unnecessary. On the contrary, the question of EU law conditions on 
procurement damages is an important topic largely because of the significant contribution 
damages remedy (theoretically) has on the functionality of EU procurement system as a whole. 
Foreseeable and regular award of damages by national courts creates a deterrent effect to 
 
8 C. Ginter & M.A. Simovart in Brussels Commentary. EU Public Procurement Law (eds M. Steinicke & P.L. 
Vesterdorf). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Verlag C.H.Beck oHG & Hart Publshing, 2018, pp 1413 § 24. 
9 H. Schebesta. Damages in EU Public Procurement Law. Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2016, p 
29.  
10 P. Trepte. Public Procurement in the EU: A Practitioner’s Guide, 2nd edition, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, p 558. 
11 Supra note 6, pp 38 & 39 (M. Burgi in Damages as an Effective Remedy). 
12 S. Treumer. Damages for breach of the EC public procurement rules – changes in European regulation and 
practice. Public Procurement Law Review, 2006, 4, p 164. 
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potential future breaches by contracting authorities13. Furthermore, aggrieved tenderers rely on 
damages claims for protection of their individual rights because in most cases, damages claim 
is the only post-contractual remedy available to aggrieved tenders14. Although the Directive 
2007/66/EC focused on a reform of pre-contractual remedies, it did not make infringements of 
procurement rules by contracting authorities obsolete in practice. The need for post-contractual 
remedies such as damages, still persists15. As put by M. A. Raimundo, “in the system of 
Remedies Directives, the importance of damages is obvious”. While Member States can, on 
some conditions, refrain from setting aside an unlawful decision (i.e., “exclude primary 
compensation”), exclusion of liability for damages is not possible under the Remedies 
Directives. Otherwise, damages “would be a fiction” deprived of any practical effect16.  
The topic of procurement damages remedy remains actual until availability of this remedy 
is in practical terms ensured to aggrieved tenderers across Member States under the Remedies 
Directives. After all, the inherent purpose behind any legal rule is to have actual effect.  
Consequently, a situation like this one in which a legal rule entitles individuals a right to claim 
damages, but which cannot be enforced in practical terms by those individuals, must not be 
tacitly accepted. Moreover, a right of an individual to compensation for harm caused by public 
authority should be a basic right inherent to legal system of all Member States by virtue of 
general EU law17. Therefore, actual need exists to scrutinize the substantive meaning behind 
EU procurement damages remedy in an attempt to find some much-needed clarity in the matter. 
Clarity of a legal rule is of paramount importance for achieving effective enforcement.  
Based on the aforementioned considerations, the objective of this thesis is to find an answer 
to a question – what are the substantive requirements imposed by EU law on procurement 
damages remedy? The fact that the Remedies Directives themselves do not provide answer to 
this question, does not mean that EU law imposes no requirements on procurement damages 
remedy. It is common knowledge that EU directives are merely a form of secondary EU law, 
inferior to primary EU law. It is presumed that the meaning behind procurement damages 
becomes clearer once we take a step back and look at the Remedies Directives as a part of EU 
legal system. Furthermore, it is submitted that availability of loss of chance as a head of damage 
 
13 M. Fuentes. The Spanish Approach to the Remedy of Damages in the Field of European Public Procurement. 
European Public Procurement & Public and Private Partnership Law Review, 2016, 11 (1), pp 49-52 (49). 
14 Supra note 9, p 27 (H. Schebesta). 
15 K-M. Halonen. Shielding against damages for ineffectiveness: the limitations of liability available for 
contracting authorities – a Finnish approach. Public Procurement Law Review, 2015, 4, p 112. 
16 M. A. Raimundo. Damages in Public Procurement Law: A Right or a Privilege? Some Thoughts After the Fosen-
Linjen Saga. European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, 2019, 14(4), p 258. 
17 Judgement of 19 November 1991, Andrea Francovich & Danila Bonifaci & Others v Italian Republic, Joined 
Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428, § 35. 
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might be required by EU law in order to solve the issue of lack of practical availability of 
procurement damages claims.   
The first chapter establishes the legal context in light of which the procurement damages 
remedy must be seen. It provides an overview of relevant primary law principles of EU law and 
addresses the general EU law requirements on claiming damages for EU law breaches. Second 
chapter aims to scrutinize the specific requirements established on procurement damages in the 
CJEU case law. Furthermore, it aims to identify the issues related claiming damages for 
procurement breaches (high standard of burden of proof, required gravity of breach and 
causation). This chapter gives indication of what is required for achieving minimal 
effectiveness of damages remedy under EU law. In third chapter, three Member State examples 
are provided for a practical understanding of limitations to procurement damages remedy and 
for illustrating a solution which would be acceptable under EU law. Firstly, English example is 
provided to illustrate a common law approach to procurement damages. Secondly, French 
example was chosen because the French system has been exemplified in legal literature as a 
positive example for procurement damages purposes. Finally, the example of Estonia was added 
due to my personal interest and also because there is not that much literature available about 
the Estonian perspective (apart from a few pages of comments in Estonian Public Procurement 
Act commentaries and some student works of limited extent). The methods used for the 
purposes of this work are systemic, analytic and comparative. It relies on journal articles, books 
and case law of the CJEU and selected Member State examples as main sources. 
It is noted that T. Tähe18 defended a master thesis on a similar topic in the University of 
Tartu in 2015. Nevertheless, besides the name of the topic, there are not many other substantive 
similarities between her thesis and my work. This work has the objective to focus on the EU 
perspective (EU law requirements), while T. Tähe attempted to approach the issue from the 
Estonian and German perspective. Moreover, the outcomes of the works differ to significant 
extent. The works of K. Saar19 and E. Fels20 contain subchapters on the topic, but only briefly 
and in general terms. Lastly, the master thesis of A. Praakle is noted as a thesis focused on the 
loss of profit and loss of chance doctrine21. While the general loss of profit and loss of chance 
doctrines are of importance to my thesis as well, it is worth mentioning that the work of A. 
Praakle afforded no consideration on public procurement law.  
 
18 T. Tähe. Kahju hüvitamine hankemenetluses toimunud rikkumiste korral. Magistritöö. Tartu Ülikool. 
Õigusteaduskond, 2015.  
19 K. Saar. Vaidlustamine riigihankemenetluses. Magistritöö. Tartu Ülikool. Õigusteaduskond, 2014, pp 59-63.  
20 E. Fels. Euroopa Liidu riigihankeõiguse normide rikkumise mõju hankelepingu kehtivusele. Magistritöö. Tartu 
Ülikool. Õigusteaduskond, 2015, pp 55-59.  
21 A. Praakle. Võimaluse kaotuse põhimõte ja selle kasutamise võimalused Eesti õiguses. Magistritöö. Tartu 
Ülikool. Õigusteaduskond, 2015.  
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To conclude the introduction, it is noted that while I agree that the ideal solution to issues 
related to procurement damages would be for the EU lawmaker and/or the CJEU to expressly 
establish substantive minimum conditions on procurement damages22, I do not believe that such 
development can be reasonably expected any time soon. The issue with procurement damages 
was identified by the European Commission impact assessment report prior to the 2007 
amendments as relatively acute23. Nevertheless, as can be seen, no amendments were made to 
procurement damages remedy, presumably because of policy considerations.  
  To this extent, enforcement of EU law illustrates similar tensions present in the making 
of international law. Like with any other international legal rule, the functionality of EU law 
comes down on the willingness of Member States to execute that law. This means that EU 
lawmaker has to be careful not to exceed its capacity over matters under discretion of Member 
States. Establishing substantive requirements on procurement damages claims is 
understandably a sensitive area. For instance, if the EU lawmaker was to expressly require that 
a Member State has to compensate much more in comparison with what the national law would 
offer to aggrieved tenderer, it could be considered an unacceptable interference with internal 
matters of a Member State. However, if EU was to leave the matter completely up to Member 
States, then there would be no purpose of having EU law in the first place – all Member States 
would do as they please with no consideration on EU law purposes. This means that the question 
of effective procurement damages remedy ultimately comes down to balancing the interests of 
Member States with those of the EU. A solution found in EU law should thus presumably 
express itself as a balance of interests between the contracting authorities (as “extensions” of 
Member States) and protection of individual interests of aggrieved tenderers.  
I am sincerely grateful to Carri Ginter for his patience, supervision and guidance which 
amounted to significant contribution in completion of this work. I take full ownership for all 
shortcomings contained within.  
 
Keywords relevant to this thesis are as follows: EU public procurement law, Remedies 




22 For example, supra note 9, p 13 (H. Schebesta). 
23 Commission of the European Communities. Commission Staff Working Document. Annex to the Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 
92/13/EEC with regard to improving effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, 
Brussels, 4 May 2006, SEC (2006) 557, p 12. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2006/sec_2006_0557_en.pdf (23.03.2021).  
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1. Scope of damages remedy under general EU law 
1.1.General principles of procedural autonomy, effective judicial protection and 
effectiveness 
A fundamental characteristic of EU is the decentralized enforcement of its law. While EU 
rules are binding on its Member States, it is for national laws to implement and national courts 
to apply EU law24. General principles of EU law serve as a minimum harmonization tool across 
Member States as well as a minimum standard of individual rights protection25. General 
principles in combination with EU treaties form the primary EU law with which the secondary 
EU law (e.g., directives) must comply with. It is common knowledge that primary EU law 
prevails over EU secondary law in the event of a conflict26. 
In the procurement field, general principles of EU law serve as an important reference point 
to determine the scope of damages remedy. That is even more so since there is no EU secondary 
law regulating the matter in substantive terms. The Remedies Directives only stipulate the 
requirement that damages remedy has to be available under national legal systems of Member 
States for parties injured by procurement breaches. Thus, the substantive EU requirements on 
procurement damages remedy must be derived from the general principles as elaborated in the 
case law of the CJEU.  
In the context of procurement damages, the CJEU has referred to the general principles of 
procedural autonomy, effectiveness and equivalence and at times, effective judicial 
protection27. Principle of equivalence is settled in the CJEU case law as a requirement that “the 
detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding individual’s rights under the EU 
law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions”28. As principle 
of equivalence does not appear as a point of substantive discussion in the context of EU 
procurement damages, it will not be specifically addressed further. Other aforementioned 
principles will be briefly discussed as follows.  
Simply put, procedural autonomy is discretion of Member States to decide on how to 
implement EU law. Upon joining the EU, Member States limit their sovereignty in order to 
 
24 P. Craig & G. de Búrca. EU Law. Text, Cases, and Materials. 5th edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2011, p 172.  
25 D. Pachnou. The effectiveness of bidder remedies for enforcing the EC public procurement rules: a case study 
of the public works sector in the United Kingdom and Greece. Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. March 2003, p 25. 
26Supra note 5, p 194 (A. J. van Heeswijck). 
27 Supra note 9, p 71 (H. Schebesta). 
28 Judgement of 9 December 2010, Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw-De Jonge Konstruktie & Others v Provincie 
Drenthe, Case C-568/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:751, § 91. 
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achieve effective enforcement of EU goals29. The principle is enshrined in Art. 5(2) of the TEU 
according to which Member States confer the EU power “to attain the objectives set out [in the 
Treaties]”. Those objectives must have primacy over discretion (i.e., procedural autonomy) of 
Member States, otherwise EU law would have no actual effect.  
The Remedies Directives, like all other EU directives, set only the minimum requirements 
of EU law. The objectives of EU lawmaker expressed in the directives must be achieved by 
Member States through transposing directives into their respective national legal systems30. As 
noted above, since the Remedies Directives are a form of secondary EU law, their interpretation 
and application must comply with primary EU law (e.g., the general principles of EU law). 
Directives leave Member States some margin of appreciation, but it is limited with the primary 
EU law to ensure at least minimum harmonization across Member States31.  
While the principle of procedural autonomy is comprehensible as a theoretical concept, it 
is difficult to draw the line between EU law and procedural autonomy of Member States32. It is 
settled in the case law of the CJEU that “in the absence of [Union] legislation, it is for the 
internal legal order of each Member State to designate the competent courts and lay down the 
detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings intended fully to safeguard the rights which 
individuals derive from [Union] law” (i.e., procedural autonomy)33. Procedural autonomy is 
limited by principles of effectiveness and equivalence34. In other words, under procedural 
autonomy, Member States still have the responsibility to ensure “that [EU rights] are efficiently 
protected in each case”35. The aforementioned CJEU guidance for delimitation of EU law and 
procedural autonomy is of general nature and too inconclusive to afford uniform understanding 
of its substantive nature in practical terms.   
In Spijker, the CJEU held the same settled but vague understanding of procedural autonomy 
applicable in the narrow context of procurement damages remedy36. This did little to clarify the 
scope of procedural autonomy in general, let alone in the field of procurement remedies. 
Opinions still differ on the extent of Member State procedural autonomy in determining the 
substantive criteria of damages remedy in procurement context.  
 
29 Z. Nicolo. Member State Liability vs National Procedural Autonomy: What Rules for Judicial Breach of EU 
Law. German Law Journal, 2010, 11 (4), p 428.  
30 Supra note 25, p 43 (D. Pachnou).  
31 Supra note 5, (p 194, A. J. van Heeswijck). 
32 Supra note 29, p 429 (Z. Nicolo). 
33Judgement of 30 September 2003, Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich, Case C-224/01, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:513, § 46.  
34 Judgement of 15 March 2017, Lucio Cesare Aquino v Belgische Staat, Case C-3/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:209,  
§ 48.  
35 Judgement of 19 October 2017, Hansruedi Raimund v Michaela Aigner, Case C-425/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:776, 
§ 40. 
36 Supra note 28, §§ 90 & 91 (Spijker, Case C-568/08). 
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Some believe that the CJEU has (almost) completely left the damages remedy under 
procedural autonomy of Member States. For instance, H. Schebesta writes that “the CJEU has 
fully subjected” damages remedy under procedural autonomy and has refrained “from 
legislative action on damages on grounds of the Member States’ procedural autonomy” in 
public procurement context37. K. Krüger argues that by virtue of procedural autonomy, it is for 
the national law to decide over the heads, causation and quantification of procurement damages, 
provided that only the minimum conditions of effectiveness and equivalence have been 
complied with38. This line of reasoning suggests that the general EU law provides no other 
conditions on damages remedy apart from the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. 
By contrast, S. Treumer has correctly noted that while it is probable that the CJEU affords 
Member States considerable discretion on grounds of procedural autonomy, they still do not 
have full control over the scope and substance of the procurement damages remedy39. As will 
be seen below, the general EU law in fact does impose additional requirements on damages 
besides the general principles of effectiveness and equivalence.  
The mere existence of the Remedies Directives already indicates above average restrictions 
on procedural autonomy of Member States. It is common knowledge that EU lawmaker usually 
leaves the establishment of procedural rules and remedies for Member States to decide under 
their respective national laws40. If the EU lawmaker would have wanted to leave the 
procurement remedies system solely under the discretion of Member States, it would have 
simply refrained from implementing the Remedies Directives in the first place. Thus, the 
Remedies Directives can be considered as an expression of the EU lawmaker’s will to restrict 
the procedural autonomy of Member States in the procurement damages field.  
While the Remedies Directives limit discretion of Member States to above usual extent, 
procedural autonomy has nevertheless not been excluded completely. Therefore, differences in 
the mechanisms established for awarding damages for procurement breaches can be expected 
across the national laws of Member States. This is an inevitable result of procedural autonomy 
- the general principles of EU law even in combination with the Remedies Directives, are 
incapable of completely harmonizing procurement damages in substantive terms41. 
There is no need to further scrutinize the exact meaning behind procedural autonomy. The 
scope of procedural autonomy does not derive from procedural autonomy itself but from 
 
37 Supra note 9, p 42 (H. Schebesta). 
38 K. Krüger. Action for Damages Due to Bad Procurement – On the Intersection between EU/EEA Law and 
National Law, with a Special Reference to the Norwegian Experience. Public Procurement Law Review, 2006, 4, 
p 211. 
39 Supra note 12, p 165 (S.Treumer in Public Procurement Law Review, 2006).  
40 Supra note 25, p 4 (D. Pachnou).  
41 Supra note 6, p 187 (D. Fairgrieve & Licéhre in Damages as an Effective Remedy). 
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limitations imposed on procedural autonomy by EU law (such as the general principles or 
directives). For the purposes of this work, it is sufficient to conclude that firstly, Member States 
have retained procedural autonomy in procurement damages field to some extent. Secondly, 
that the procedural autonomy of Member States in this context lies somewhere between the 
general EU law principles and conditions stipulated in the Remedies Directives. 
Coming to the principle of effectiveness, it is firstly noted that all legal remedies systems 
essentially carry a presumption of effectiveness within the general meaning of the word. 
Inherent function of all remedies is to offer actual alleviation to harm caused by infringement 
of law to at least some minimum extent. Theoretically existing, yet practically unenforceable 
remedies, can hardly be considered effective. In the context of damages, effective enforcement 
in general meaning of the word presumes that damages are awarded in the amount which 
corresponds to actual harm caused.  
The functionality of the Remedies Directives and implementing national laws rely on the 
principle of effectiveness42. It is said to have been developed from Art. 4(3) of the TEU43 which 
establishes obligation on Member States, firstly to ensure fulfilment of EU obligations and 
secondly to refrain from jeopardizing the EU’s objectives. In the context of public procurement, 
the principle of effectiveness is often expressed within the traditional Rewe44/Comet45 meaning 
which requires that national law must not “make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult 
[for injured persons] to obtain reparation [for EU law breaches]”46. 
However, some authors argue that in the context of public procurement remedies the 
aforementioned understanding of effectiveness ought to be rejected. For instance, D. Pachnou 
argues that effectiveness within the meaning of Simmenthal47, should be applied instead48. In 
Simmenthal, the CJEU held that “any provision of a national legal system … which might 
impair the effectiveness of [Union] law …[and] which might prevent [Union] law from having 
full force and effect is incompatible with those requirements which are the very essence of 
[Union] law”49. Thus, according to the Simmenthal requirement, principle of effectiveness can 
be interpreted as Member States’ responsibility to achieve the “full force and effect” of EU 
 
42 C. H. Bovis. Access to Justice and Remedies in Public Procurement. European Procurement & Public Private 
Partnership Law Review, 2012, 7(3), p 201. 
43 Supra note 25, p 24 (D. Pachnou).  
44 Judgement of 16 December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG & Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für 
das Saarland, Case 33-76, ECLI:EU:C:1976:188 § 5.  
45 Judgement of 16 December 1976, Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45-76, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:191 § 13. 
46 Supra note 17, § 43 (Francovich, Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90). 
47 Judgement of 9 March 1978, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, Case 106/77, 
ECLI:EU:C:1978:49.  
48 Supra note 25, p 32 (D. Pachnou).  
49 Supra note 47, § 22 (Simmenthal, Case 106/77). 
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legal rules. Moreover, Simmenthal implies obligation of Member States to apply higher 
standards than those stipulated in national law if national rules do not enable the adequate 
achievement of a standard required by EU law50.  
The main reason for preferring the Simmenthal requirement over Rewe/Comet requirement 
is the fact that Simmenthal effectiveness is wider in scope, enabling more consideration to the 
achievement of EU purposes. As national remedies in procurement context are provided by the 
Remedies Directives, rules contained therein must be enforced by Member States (similarly to 
all other EU legal rules) to achieve their “full force and effect”. Member States have to ensure 
compliance of their national laws with minimum standards of EU law as developed in the case 
law of CJEU. Rewe/Comet effectiveness on the other hand refers solely to the effectiveness of 
minimum EU conditions on national procedural rules used for the enforcement of EU law, 
which are usually completely up for Member States to create. Such effectiveness would afford 
only the slightest protection of EU law goals which is insufficient for procurement field 
purposes51. Thus, as Remedies Directives are rules of EU law, their “full force and effect” must 
be ensured for achieving compliance with the principle of effectiveness.  
According to H. Schebesta, it is appropriate to interpret the principle of effectiveness within 
the van Schijndel meaning52. In van Schijndel, the CJEU first referred to the traditional 
effectiveness requirement of “[not make it] impossible or excessively difficult … to obtain 
reparation”. Such effectiveness “must be analysed by reference to the role of [EU] provision in 
the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole…”. Furthermore, that 
analysis should consider “basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as … the 
principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure… where appropriate”53.  
Strongly in favour for the argument to use van Schijndel effectiveness within the 
procurement context is the fact that in part, the CJEU followed similar reasoning in the 
infamous procurement damages case of Strabag. For determining compliance with the principle 
of effectiveness, the CJEU required that EU damages remedy is “interpreted in the light of the 
general context and the aim of the judicial remedy of damages” and then measured against 
national provision implementing EU rule54.  
It is noteworthy that in van Schijndel, the CJEU referred to effectiveness also as a balancing 
exercise. Consideration of the basic principles of national law is acceptable when determining 
 
50 Supra note 25, pp 31 & 32 (D. Pachnou). 
51 Ibid.  
52 Supra note 9, p 56 (H. Schebesta).  
53 Judgement of 14 December 1995, Jeroen van Schijndel & Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v Stichting 
Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, Joined Cases C-430/93 & C-431/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:441, § 39. 
54 Judgement of 30 September 2010, Stadt Graz v Strabag AG & Others, Case C-314/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:567, 
§ 34. 
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compliance with the principle of effectiveness. Effectiveness is thus not only a standard against 
which the application of other applicable general principles of law (primary law) and EU rules 
on procurement (secondary law) must be measured against55. Notwithstanding that, the CJEU 
did not follow the balancing exercise part of the reasoning in Strabag thus did not elaborate on 
its (scope of) applicability in procurement field but neither did the CJEU exclude the possibility. 
Therefore, the balancing nature of effectiveness can be borne in mind for the purposes of 
procurement cases as well.  
The principle of effectiveness needs to be understood as requirement on the Member States 
to achieve “full force and effect” of the EU legal rule (i.e., the Simmenthal effectiveness), which 
restricts the procedural autonomy of the Member States to a necessary extent for the 
achievement of the EU law. The achievement of “full force and effect” is wider in scope and 
would therefore essentially cover the Rewe/Comet effectiveness requirement of “not make it 
virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation”. Such “full force and effect” 
of EU law and effectiveness will only be achieved once damages remedies for procurement 
breaches become regularly claimable in practice. Otherwise, damages remedy in procurement 
cannot be held to even exist, let alone be considered effective.  
There is no uniform understanding of whether the principle of effectiveness extends solely 
to the effectiveness of the remedies system as a whole or to each remedy individually. Some 
authors suggest that a remedies system which is consistent with principle of effectiveness must 
meet two cumulative criteria – it must be effective as a whole functioning system, and also each 
of the remedies must be effective individually56. The remedies must thus not be seen to be in a 
“fixed relationship” amongst themselves57. Others argue that remedies under the Remedies 
Directives are interrelated and must be seen in the context of the whole system. The 2007 reform 
changed the balance between the procurement remedies and gave rise to questions of 
hierarchy58. By this line of reasoning focus seems to be on the effectiveness of a system as a 
whole rather than on each remedy itself.  
The idea that each procurement remedy must be effective on its own is consistent with the 
intent of the EU lawmaker. The required remedies for procurement breaches have been listed 
in the Remedies Directives, suggesting that all of them must be available to injured parties if 
not expressly stipulated otherwise. If Member States would only be expected to achieve 
effectiveness of a remedy system as a whole, they could justify the practical absence of one 
 
55 D. Soloveičik. The Principle of Effectiveness in Lithuanian Public Procurement Law: This Way or No Way. 
European Procurement & Private Partnership Law Review, 2016, 11(2), pp 60 & 61. 
56 Supra note 25, p 37 (D. Pachnou), also supra note 8, pp 1405 & 1406 § 7 (Brussels Commentary). 
57 Supra note 6, p 189 (D. Fairgrieve & F. Lichère, Damages as an Effective Remedy).  
58 Supra note 9, pp 51 & 52 (H. Schebesta).  
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remedy (e.g., damages) by arguing the system as a whole is sufficiently effective (i.e., efficiency 
of one remedy could compensate for the absence of another). Sure enough, there would be no 
need to claim damages if primary remedies (i.e., those directed at correcting infringement prior 
to the conclusion of the contract) could always be relied on. The lack of factual need to claim 
damages can suggest the efficiency of a remedies system as a whole. Nevertheless, this cannot 
serve as an excuse for the factual absence of a remedy listed in the Remedies Directives. If such 
need should arise, all remedies must be individually available to injured parties.  
Liability for damages is at the heart of effectiveness of the enforcement of public 
procurement rules due to its dual purpose of deterrence and protection of individual rights59. 
By affording protection to individual rights, the injured parties are given incentive to draw 
attention to breaches of the contracting authority. The possibility of injured parties to litigate 
should deter the contracting authority from potential future unlawful conduct, as it knows that 
it might be held liable for damages in the event of a breach of procurement rules60.  
It is settled in the CJEU case law, that the Member States have “to ensure that neither the 
effectiveness of [the Remedies Directives] nor the rights conferred on individuals by EU law 
are undermined”61. Nevertheless, it seems that general consensus in legal literature is that 
procurement damages remedy does not fulfil the conditions of principle of effectiveness62. As 
S. L. Kaleda has correctly pointed out – damages remedy as it currently stands, cannot be 
considered effective in any sense of the word since its legal outcome is unpredictable. That 
holds true even despite the fact that the general principle of effectiveness imposes no clear 
substantive minimum standard which procurement damages remedy has to comply with63. 
Third principle sometimes referred to by the CJEU in context of procurement damages is 
the principle of effective judicial protection. It imposes minimum requirements to ensure right 
of fair trial to individuals and requires national procedural law to be interpreted in a manner 
which benefits “the achievement of the EU law”64. Additionally, the principle of effective 
judicial protection stipulates that effective remedy must be available to harmed individuals in 
all cases of EU law infringements by Member States65. In general, the principle has been said 
 
59 Supra note 16, p 258 (M. A. Raimundo). 
60 S. Arrowsmith. European Communities: the implications of the Court of Justice decision in Marshall for 
damages in the field of public procurement. Public Procurement Law Review, 1993, 6, CS169 & 170. 
61Judgement of 7 August 2019, Hochtief AG v Budapest Főváros Önkormányzata, Case 300-17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:635, § 38. 
62 Supra note 4, p 61 (A. Reich & O. Shabat).  
63 S. L. Kaleda. Claims for damages in EU procurement and effective protection of individual rights. European 
Law Review, 2014, 39(2), p 208. 
64 Supra note 5, p 192 (A. J. van Heeswijck).  
65 Supra note 60, CS172 (S. Arrowsmith). 
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to be relatively well developed in the case law of the CJEU66 related to the use of legal remedies 
against unlawful behaviour of the Member States67. It is currently established in Art. 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU68 and in Art. 19(1) of the TEU.  
It remains unclear whether the principle of effectiveness encompasses the principle of 
effective judicial protection or should they be considered separately. For example, in Pontin, 
the CJEU considered the principle of effective judicial protection as an expression of the general 
Member State obligation to comply with principles of effectiveness and equivalence in their 
national laws69. The CJEU reached the opposite conclusion in Mono Car Styling, stating that 
EU law requires that effective judicial protection is separately considered in addition to 
obligation of adhering to principles of effectiveness and equivalence70. 
Some authors argue that principle of effective judicial protection must always be clearly 
distinguished from the general principle of effectiveness71. For instance, S. L. Kaleda maintains 
that principle of effective judicial protection serves as a basis for individual protection of rights 
in the context of EU procurement rules. Judicial protection makes it possible for aggrieved 
tenderers to claim damages for procurement breaches in the first place72. By contrast, others do 
not even mention the principle of effective judicial protection when writing about damages 
remedy in procurement, suggesting that effective judicial protection is either irrelevant or 
covered within the scope of principle of effectiveness. For example, according to C. H. Bovis 
three main principles that are prevalent in the case law of CJEU related to the Remedies 
Directives are the principle of procedural autonomy and its interrelationship with principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence73.  
Even if one was to assume that principle of effectiveness must be clearly differentiated 
from principle of effective judicial protection, their interrelationship remains unresolved in the 
case law of the CJEU74. Importantly, the CJEU has not given the principle of effective judicial 
protection substantive value in its case law concerning the interpretation of damages and has 
merely on occasion mentioned the principle75. For example, in Hospital Ingenieure, the CJEU 
 
66 Judgement of 15 May 1986, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, § 17 & § 19.  
67 R. Caranta. Damages in EU Public Procurement Law: Fosen-Linjen Can Hardly Be the Last Chapter. European 
Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review, 2019, 14(4), p 215.  
68 Judgement of 6 November 2012, European Commission v Otis, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684, § 46.  
69 Judgement of 29 October 2009, Virginie Pontin v T-Comalux SA, Case C-63/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:666, §§ 43 
& 44.  
70 Judgement of 16 July 2009, Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation v Dervis Odemis & Others, Case C-12/08, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:466, § 49. 
71 Supra note 9, p 38 (H. Schebesta).  
72 Supra note 63, p 193 (S. L. Kaleda). 
73 Supra note 42, p 195 (C. H. Bovis). 
74 Supra note 9, pp 39 & 40 (H. Schebesta).  
75 Supra note 9, p 71 (H. Schebesta). 
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stated that “judicial review exercised in the context of the review procedures covered by 
89/665/EEC must be examined in the light of the purpose of the latter, taking care that its 
effectiveness is not undermined”76. Although the CJEU used the term “judicial review”, it did 
not actually elaborate on the principle of effective judicial protection. Instead, the importance 
to ensure the effectiveness of the rules stipulated in the directive was highlighted.  
Requirements traditionally enshrined in the effective judicial protection doctrine are 
nevertheless important and cannot be left aside. For instance, in Hochtief, the CJEU highlighted 
the significance of the Member State obligation to ensure the availability of effective remedy 
pursuant Art. 47 of the Charter in the context of procurement law77. As procurement is a field 
highly harmonized in substantive terms by the EU law78, the need of effective remedies is even 
more so pressing for the protection of EU procurement system as a whole. The willingness of 
individuals to bring actions against Member States in breach with the EU law ensures the 
fulfilment of EU legal obligations79. Individuals cannot be reasonably expected to pursue 
litigation against State if there is no chance of reparation of harm (i.e., effective remedy, such 
as a foreseeable chance of obtaining award of damages).  
However, for the purposes of this work, conclusive delimitation between effectiveness and 
effective judicial protection carries little practical significance. As long as the minimum 
conditions of Art. 19(1) of TEU and Art. 47 of the Charter are fulfilled, it is not decisive whether 
effective judicial protection is considered as a condition under general effectiveness principle 
or as a separate self-standing principle next to effectiveness.  
All in all, the principle of effectiveness serves to afford protection to the purpose and 
functionality of the EU law. In the context of Remedies Directives, the EU lawmaker has 
required that injured parties must be able to claim damages for procurement breaches. As 
damages remedy is not much further elaborated in the Remedies Directives, it remains for the 
general principles (such as effectiveness) to provide minimum standard of compliance with the 
EU law. Based on the above, it can be concluded that at minimum, effectiveness requires that 
injured parties should be able to obtain reparation for harm caused to them by procurement 
breaches (regardless of whether “full force and effect” or “not excessively difficult” standard 




76 Judgement of 18 June 2002, Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik Planungs-Gesellschaft mbH (HI) v Stadt 
Wien, Case C-92/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:379, §§ 58 & 59. 
77 Supra note 61, § 39 (Hochtief, Case 300-17) 
78Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU & 2014/25/EU.  
79 Judgement of 5 February 1963, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26-62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p 13. 
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1.2. EU law conditions on liability for damages  
Since the landmark Francovich80 case, it has been well established in the CJEU case law, 
that Member States are liable for harm caused to individuals by EU law infringements81. In 
Francovich, the CJEU established substantive minimum criteria of State liability to ensure their 
uniform application across Member States82. The CJEU has maintained that “the principle of 
State liability … is inherent in the system of [EU]”83. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
effective functioning of the decentralized enforcement of EU law relies in part on the 
disposition of harmed individuals to act in response to the breach84.  
Individuals harmed by Member State breaches of EU law are entitled to claim damages 
when a) Member State breached a rule of [EU] law which conferred rights on individuals, b) 
breach is sufficiently serious and c) there is a causal link between the breach and the damage. 
When those minimum conditions are fulfilled, the right to recover reparation for harm derives 
directly from EU law85. Moreover, these conditions must be interpreted in a way which enables 
to achieve the positive effect of EU law86.  
The Francovich State liability conditions are extensively used in the CJEU practice and 
have been widely discussed in legal literature87. For the purposes of this thesis, only a short 
overview of those minimum general liability conditions is provided.  
First condition of State liability requires that Member State has to be in breach with EU 
legal rule which confers rights on individuals. While the wording of the first condition in 
Francovich expressly requires a breach of a “Member State”, this requirement has been 
interpreted to be relatively broad. The CJEU has held that the principle stands in the event of 
the EU law breach “whichever is the authority of the Member State whose act or omission was 
responsible for the breach”. This is because for the purposes of liability for a breach, State is 
considered as a one whole entity, all authorities of which are bound by the EU legal rules “which 
directly govern the situation of individuals”88.  
The “individual right” part of the criterion is superficially settled in case law as a 
requirement that EU legal rule “protects an individual interest, without … requiring 
enforceability of an individual right in the strict sense”89. Thus, the substantive meaning behind 
 
80 Supra note 17, (Francovich, Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90).  
81 C. Ginter. Riigi vastutus õigusmõistmisel tekitatud kahju eest. Juridica, 2004, 8, lk 521.  
82 Supra note 8, p 1408 § 17 (Brussels Commentary).  
83 Supra note 17, § 35 (Francovich, Joined cases C-6/90 & C-9/90). 
84 Supra note 79, p 13 (van Gend en Loos, Case 26/62).  
85 Supra note 17, §§ 35 & 40 & 41 (Francovich, Joined cases C-6/90 & C-9/90). 
86 Supra note 29, p 425 (Z. Nicolo). 
87 Supra note 8, p 1407 § 16 (Brussels Commentary).  
88 Supra note 33, §§ 31 & 32 (Köbler, Case C-224/01).  
89 Supra note 9, p 43 (H. Schebesta).  
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the “confer rights on individuals” part of the first condition remains unclear. T. Lock points out 
that this is mainly the result of the CJEU reluctance to clearly establish the definition of a “right” 
for the purposes of the State liability doctrine90.  
For example, in Dillenkofer the CJEU hinted that individuals are entitled to claim damages 
“where the result prescribed by the directive entails the grant of rights to individuals, the content 
of those rights is identifiable on the basis of the provisions of the directive….”91. Thus, there is 
no State liability if the content of a right does not derive from the directive and is left under 
procedural autonomy of Member States to refine92. However, this definition does not afford 
much guidance on how to establish whether or not a right can be derived from a directive. In 
other words, there is no conclusive uniform elaboration on what amounts to minimum standard 
of an “identifiable right”93. In the end, it will be for the national courts to interpret the relevant 
EU instrument to establish whether or not it is intended to confer rights on individuals94. With 
reasonable certainty, it can only be concluded that the first condition is definitely fulfilled only 
in those cases where a directive expressly establishes rights on individuals.  
This is exactly the case in procurement field since the inherent purpose of the Remedies 
Directives is to inter alia confer rights on individuals. For instance, Art. 1(3) of Directive 
89/665/EEC refers directly to the rights of individuals by obliging Member States to “ensure 
that review procedures are available … at least to any person having or having had an interest 
in obtaining a particular contract and who has been, or risks being harmed by an alleged 
infringement”. In Art. 2 of Directive 89/665/EEC specific remedies are listed which must be 
available for those persons under national law. Therefore, as the fulfilment of the first condition 
has not posed a challenge in the field of procurement, no further general consideration is given 
to this condition.  
Secondly, to hold a Member State liable, the breach of the EU legal rule has to be 
“sufficiently serious”. It must be noted that the “sufficiently serious breach” under State liability 
is an autonomous standard under the EU law which has to be uniformly applied across EU. 
 
90 T. Lock. Is private enforcement of EU law through State Liability a Myth: An Assessment 20 Years after 
Francovich. Common Market Law Review, 2012, 49(5), p 1693.  
91 Judgement of 8 October 1996, Erich Dillenkofer, Christian Edmann, Hans-Jürgen Schulte, Anke Heuer, Werner, 
Ursula & Trosten Knor v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 & 
C-190/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:375, § 22.  
92 A. Taro. Euroopa Ühenduse õiguse rikkumisega tekitatud kahju. Ühenduse liikmesriigi vastutus. Juridica, 2003, 
3, p 175.  
93 Supra note 90 (p 1693, T. Lock).  
94 A. Biondi & M. Farley. The right to damages in European Law, Alphen aan den Riin, Kluwer Law International, 
2009, p 32.  
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Therefore, Member States are not at liberty to equate “sufficiently serious breach” with any 
national law requirement of fault if that concept of fault constitutes a stricter standard95.  
In order to decide if a breach is “sufficiently serious”, the national court has to consider all 
relevant circumstances of the case. Particularly important is to contemplate “clarity and 
precision of the rule infringed”, intention of the wrongdoer, scope of discretion and possible 
justifications to the infringement96. This means that the scope of a Member State’s discretion is 
at the heart of the “seriousness” of a breach. The wider the margin of appreciation, the harder 
it is for the injured individual to establish that there had been a “sufficiently serious” breach97. 
The breach is definitely “sufficiently serious” in any case where has been a manifest breach of 
the CJEU case law98 i.e., it is clear from the CJEU case law that “the conduct in question 
constituted an infringement”99. Any infringement may amount to “sufficiently serious” also 
when “the Member State .... had only considerably reduced, or even, no discretion” to exercise 
its legislative powers100.  
According to T. Lock, national courts are usually willing to establish the existence of a 
“sufficiently serious” breach in the event of aforementioned “clear-cut” infringement cases (i.e., 
EU law non-transposition cases and cases where breach was not eliminated even after it had 
been established by the CJEU). Nevertheless, national courts appear reluctant to hold that there 
has been a “sufficiently serious” breach when they have to contemplate whether the Member 
State remained within the limits of its discretion (i.e., cases of alleged “incorrect transposition 
of Directives”). That is why some authors believe that the Member State discretion makes the 
“seriousness” of a breach hardest of the three conditions for the injured party to prove101.  
Thirdly, there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the EU rule and the 
damage sustained. The necessary conditions for establishing such causal link are for national 
laws and courts to determine, provided that EU general principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness are complied with102. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the concept of 
“direct causal link” in context of State liability is an autonomous one across EU and remains 
 
95 Judgement of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and the Queen v Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd & others, Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, 
§ 79. 
96 Supra note 33, §§ 54 & 55 (Köbler, Case C-224/01) 
97 Supra note 90 (p 1693, T. Lock).  
98 Supra note 33, § 56 (Köbler, Case C-224/01). 
99 Supra note 95, § 87 (Brasserie du Pêcheur, Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93).  
100 Judgement of 4 July 2000, Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereiningung Nordhein, Case C-424/97, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:357, § 38. 
101 Supra note 90, pp 1693 & 1694 & 1701 (T. Lock).  
102 Judgement of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd & Others, Case C-453/99, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, § 29.  
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under governance of EU law103. Therefore, Member States cannot impose higher demands in 
their national laws compared to those stipulated by EU law.  
It has been well established in the CJEU case law that the three aforementioned State 
liability conditions “are necessary and sufficient to found a right in individuals to obtain 
redress”. Member States are not at liberty to impose stricter standards for State liability104. 
Liability for damages in case of EU public procurement law breaches must thus be considered 
as one particularization under the general State liability doctrine. Hence, the same three 
minimum general conditions apply to claiming damages for procurement breaches105.  
This argument is strengthened by the fact that the CJEU made an express reference to State 
liability doctrine in procurement damages landmark case of Spijker. The CJEU held that Art. 
2(1)(c) of Directive 89/665/EEC106 “gives concrete expression to the principle of State liability” 
and cited the three general State liability conditions. The CJEU further noted that its case law 
is yet to develop a more detailed regulation for the purposes of procurement damages107. This 
means that apart from the State liability doctrine and general principles of the EU law, there are 
no additional EU law requirements to establish liability for damages in the field of procurement.  
This is supported by the fact that EU secondary law in the form of the Remedies Directives 
provides no express substantive prerequisites for claiming damages for procurement breaches. 
Had it been the intent of the EU lawmaker to stray from the already existing State liability 
doctrine, it would have simply established procurement liability conditions in the Remedies 
Directives. Lack thereof suggests the reluctance of the EU lawmaker to create a new or 
additional liability standards and the intent to subject procurement damages under general State 
liability108. Consequently, State liability in combination with general principles is applicable as 
a general rules of EU law due to the absence of lex specialis. 
The idea of using State liability doctrine as the main requirement under EU law to 
determine liability for procurement damages, has been criticized in the legal literature. It is 
mainly argued that the State liability doctrine restricts effective enforcement of the procurement 
damages remedy in practice109. Some authors believe that liability for damages under the 
general EU law (i.e., State liability) ought to be separated from liability under the Remedies 
Directives. By this line of reasoning, it is possible to apply different standards (than State 
 
103 Supra note 92, p p 177 (A.Taro). 
104 Supra note 95, § 66 (Brasserie du Pêcheur, Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93). 
105 A. Sanchez-Graells. The EFTA Court’s Fosen-Linjen Saga on Procurement Damages: A There and Back Again 
Walk. European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Review, 2019, 14(4), p 259. 
106 „Member States shall ensure that the measures taken concerning the review procedures specified in Art. 1 
include provision for powers to award damages to persons harmed by an infringement“ (text of Art. 2(1)(c)).  
107 Supra note 28, §§ 87 & 88 (Spijker, Case C-568/08). 
108 Supra note 8, p 1409 § 18 (Brussels Commentary). 
109 Supra note 9, p 65 (H. Schebesta).  
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liability) to establish liability for procurement damages110. As will be seen, the use of different 
standards for procurement purposes by this line of reasoning is justified by effectiveness 
considerations.  
According to D. Pachnou, the fact that EU law (i.e., the Remedies Directives) expressly 
requires the availability of procurement damages remedy indicates that in comparison with 
general State liability doctrine, “stronger obligation” of Member States to achieve effectiveness 
of damages remedy is required111. This means that while the State liability conditions remain 
applicable, they ought to be customized in order to ensure the achievement of full force and 
effect of procurement damages remedy.  
H. Schebesta has strongly advocated for strict differentiation between State liability and 
effectiveness damages as different types of liability (separation thesis). The purpose of State 
liability is to ensure implementation of EU law by Member States. If national law contains even 
a theoretical possibility to claim damages for procurement breaches, it can be held that the 
Member State has fulfilled its transposition duty and thus cannot be liable for breach under the 
State liability doctrine112. By contrast, effectiveness is the “enforcement of EU specific 
obligations” and must consider the “particular context of the area of law”. Substantive 
procurement law is highly harmonized on the EU level. The Remedies Directives are designed 
to protect and achieve full force and effect of EU procurement law system as a whole113. 
H. Schebesta suggests applying effectiveness damages and State liability not “as a hybrid 
or minimum floor but sequentially”. For achievement of effective damages remedy, its 
substantive conditions cannot be left under procedural autonomy of Member States as 
suggested in Spijker. Resorting to State liability results “in conjuring a loophole through which 
the Member State might escape liability by retreating safely into national law”. Unlike 
effectiveness, State liability is incapable of establishing any substantive damages conditions 
and is related only to the compensation aspect of damages. The CJEU would be unable to 
consider the “specialities of the procurement sector”114. H. Schebesta thus considers Spijker to 
be “disappointing” primarily due to unwillingness of the CJEU to “engage with the question 
[of damages] in substantive terms”115.  
As established above, the unclear interrelationship between effectiveness and general State 
liability forms a vicious circle. On one hand, the general State liability doctrine can be said to 
 
110 Supra note 105, p 248 (A. Sanchez-Graells). 
111 Supra note 25, p 88 (Pachnou).  
112 Supra note 9, p 70 (H. Schebesta).  
113 Supra note 9, pp 65 & 66 (H. Schebesta).  
114 Supra note 9, pp 68 & 70 & 71 (H. Schebesta).  
115 Supra note 9, p 60 (H. Schebesta). 
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have crystallized in the EU law (i.e., “inherent to the system of the Treaty”116). Furthermore, 
the CJEU has expressly held State liability applicable in the field of EU public procurement 
law damages. There is also no substantive EU lex specialis on the matter since the Remedies 
Directives do not expressly stipulate an alternative standard of liability. Hence, it can be 
concluded that State liability is relevant for the purposes of determining liability for 
procurement damages and cannot be excluded completely.   
On the other hand, the applicability of the general principle of effectiveness is also not 
disputed. However, it is correctly concluded in the legal literature, that despite the principle, in 
practice no effective damages remedy for procurement breaches exists117. This holds true 
regardless of whether effectiveness is defined by “not make it virtually impossible or 
excessively difficult”118 requirement or “obligation to achieve full force and effect”119 
requirement.  Consequently, procurement damages remedy does not fulfil the requirements of 
effectiveness.  
This raises a question of hierarchy between State liability and effectiveness. If we accept, 
that achievement of both concurrently is impossible, which one prevails over the other? Can 
the conditions of State liability be altered for sake of effectiveness? And if so, to what extent? 
From the perspective of procedural autonomy, the use of effectiveness to restrict the 
discretion of Member State even further is obviously unfavourable. It could be argued that such 
use of effectiveness would exceed powers conferred upon EU by the Member States. From the 
perspective of the effective enforcement of EU law however, the use of effectiveness to restrict 
procedural autonomy seems unavoidable. After all, the requirement of availability of damages 
remedy in the Remedies Directives suggests the will of the EU lawmaker to afford higher 
protection to such remedy than it would have been afforded under the general EU law.  
It is submitted that the use of effectiveness to customize State liability for procurement 
purposes might be justified to minimal necessary extent. Effective enforcement of the EU 
objectives via EU law is the inherent purpose of the Union. If this fundamental purpose could 
be set aside by virtue of procedural autonomy every time practical obstacles arise, EU law 
would become a mere formality, void of substance.  
It has been suggested in legal literature that to gain effectiveness of procurement damages 
remedy, the general State liability conditions ought to be relaxed in public procurement field. 
The CJEU gender discrimination case law in employment field should serve as an example and 
be applied by analogy. It would aim to afford aggrieved tenderers considerable probability to 
 
116 Supra note 17, § 35 (Francovich, Joined cases C-6/90 & C-9/90). 
117 Supra note 63, p 208 (S. L. Kaleda). 
118 Supra note 17, § 35 (Francovich, Joined cases C-6/90 & C-9/90). 
119 Supra note 47, § 22 (Simmenthal, Case 106/77). 
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succeed in claiming damages for procurement breaches (i.e., serves to contribute legal certainty 
and the existence of effective remedy).  
The main implications of the use of the CJEU discrimination law would be firstly that 
solely a proof of breach gives rise to liability for damages120. Secondly, that burden of proof 
could be shifted if circumstances of the case so require121. Therefore, effectiveness would be 
achieved by making it easier for an injured party to show that preconditions for awarding 
damages are fulfilled in their particular case.  
The use of gender discrimination law in this context is appropriate because it shares 
multiple inherent similarities with public procurement law. Firstly, both are grounded on 
principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and equality of opportunity. Secondly, both 
include competition between two or more candidates who may be evaluated on subjective 
criteria, determination of which is under wide discretion of either the employer or the 
contracting authority respectively. Thirdly, the subjectivity and broad discretion puts the injured 
party in a weak position to prove the (required gravity of) infringement and causation. Fourthly, 
while the remedies in both fields are established in a broad manner, they both carry the dual 
inherent purpose of reparation for harm caused and deterrence of potential future breaches122. 
Hence, gender discrimination law and public procurement law are sufficiently similar to justify 
the use of similar standards to establish liability for damages.  
The CJEU gender discrimination law uses State liability doctrine as a starting point. The 
conditions are however adjusted to enable the enforcement of intended effect of gender 
discrimination law123. Customization is needed in the event of alleged gender discrimination, 
because similarly to procurement breaches, it would otherwise be relatively difficult if not 
impossible for the injured party to prove that State liability conditions are met. As the right of 
gender equality is of “fundamental importance”124, it must be afforded effective protection in 
practice. The relaxation of general EU law standards is thus justified, since there is no other 
reasonably efficient method to achieve effective protection of such a fundamental right.  
In context of employment, decision to employ someone is usually based on a combination 
of different factors. To decide which candidate is the best, employer should be at liberty to 
consider objective as well as subjective criteria characterizing the candidates. For instance, 
 
120 Supra note 6, p 156 (S. Treumer in Damages as an Effective Remedy).  
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Public Procurement Law Review, 2003, 4, p 155. 
124Judgement of 26 February 1986, M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority (Teaching), Case 152/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:84, § 36. 
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previous work experience and educational background are relevant objective criteria. 
Nevertheless, an employer cannot be condemned for evaluating candidates on relevant 
subjective criteria as well (e.g., motivation, attitude, teamwork skills etc). This means that an 
employer has a relatively broad discretion in determining necessary criteria and their overall 
importance when deciding which candidate to employ. It makes it easy for the employer in 
breach to hide discrimination behind this wide discretion.  
The same holds true in procurement procedures, especially when the contract is awarded 
based on the “most economically advantageous tender”125. The purpose of the aforementioned 
criteria is to award the contract to tenderer who offers the best value for money. In principle, it 
is possible to determine best value for money either based on price only or considering price in 
combination with other criteria related to the object of procurement procedure126. According to 
the settled case law of the CJEU, the “most economically advantageous tender is to be identified 
from the point of view of the contracting authority”. This means that the contracting authority 
is afforded significant discretion in determining the necessary award criteria in order to decide 
on which of the tenders was the “most economically advantageous”. Requirements included in 
substantive procurement directives on determining the “most economically advantageous 
tender” are non-exhaustive. However, conditions for such determination must be related to the 
subject-matter of the contract in question127. The latter does not mean that award criteria can 
only relate to aspects of “purely economic nature”. In Concordia Bus Finland, the CJEU 
subsequently held that “it cannot be excluded that factors which are not purely economic may 
influence the value of a tender from the point of view of the contracting authority”128. Therefore, 
the contracting authority has wide discretion in establishing award criteria which might include 
objective and subjective criteria and the weights of such criteria, as long as they are related to 
the subject-matter of the contract.  
From the candidate/tenderer perspective, the aforementioned subjectivity and broad margin 
of appreciation makes it challenging to prove that there has been an infringement (i.e., 
discrimination or breach of procurement rules) in the first place. This can mainly be attributed 
to the fact that the candidates usually have very little information about other candidates and/or 
their offers. Consequently, there are very little to no factual evidence available for the candidate 
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on which their allegations could be based on. Logically, in most cases, lack of factual evidence 
inevitably results in the inability of an injured party to prove infringement has taken place at 
all.  
Furthermore, it is reminded from previous, that proof of breach itself is not enough to give 
rise to liability for damages under general EU law– there must be a “sufficiently serious” 
breach. As established above, the wider discretion afforded to the Member State (or any other 
entity whose behaviour can be attributed to the Member State), the harder it is to prove the 
required gravity of infringement under the State liability doctrine. This is because State liability 
seems to use the criterion of “sufficiently serious” to characterize the intent behind the breach. 
The fact that breach must be of sufficient gravity, suggests that room for error is afforded under 
State liability. If a Member State as an employer or contracting authority has acted in good faith 
within the limits of its discretion, it is difficult to convincingly argue that the breach had been 
“sufficiently” serious. Thus, in order to condemn the Member State for a breach, it must have 
been at least negligent towards its obligation. It is hard to imagine how one can conclusively 
prove such negligence in such context where all decisions made inherently contain subjective 
considerations. 
Even if the candidate was somehow able to establish that there had been a sufficiently 
serious breach, they would still have a hard time proving causation under general State liability 
conditions. As noted above, general State liability requires direct causal link between breach 
and damage. This raises the same question of what is the meaning behind this damage? Is the 
fact of infringement enough to constitute to damage or must the candidate be able to establish 
that discrimination lost them the employment? Or in similar terms, is it necessary to prove that 
absent the breach an injured party had been awarded the procurement contract?  
To accept that infringement itself is sufficient to rise liability for damages, would certainly 
increase the likelihood that an injured party is able to fulfil the required burden of proof. It 
would also mean that the applicability of the third condition of State liability is rejected. 
However, such possibility cannot be derived from the general EU law (i.e., the State liability 
doctrine). Thus, its use would need express justification from either the EU lawmaker or the 
CJEU.  
On the other hand, to require that the candidate must be able to prove that absent 
infringement, they would have been employed, is to set the standard of proof unachievably high 
for most cases. It is difficult to imagine how could the candidate be able to convincingly argue 
that they would have been employed, considering that only very little information is available 
to them. To rebut such claim, employer would only need to make it believable that absent 
infringement, a third candidate would have been employed. Therefore, upholding requirement 
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of State liability would deprive all persons experiencing gender discrimination in employment 
process from actual legal protection. Similar consideration holds true for procurement cases. 
In order to resolve such issues for gender equality purposes, the CJEU held in Dekker that 
“any breach of the prohibition if discrimination must, in itself, be sufficient to make the 
employer liable, without there being any possibility of invoking the grounds of exemption 
provided by national law”129. Furthermore, in Royal Copenhagen, the CJEU established that 
while burden of proof will usually be on the party bringing the proceedings, it “may be shifted 
when that is necessary to avoid depriving workers who appear to be victims of discrimination 
of any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal pay”130.  
The aforementioned means that the CJEU relaxed the standard of State liability. This was 
to afford persons injured by alleged discrimination to have an actual opportunity to meet the 
necessary standard of proof - such alleviation of standard was necessary to enable liability for 
damages to arise. As similar difficulties of providing sufficient proof of gravity of breach and 
causation characterize public procurement procedures, reducing the burden of proof of the 
injured party in a similar fashion might thus be justified to achieve effective protection of the 
EU substantive public procurement law.  
Under EU gender discrimination, full compensation is in order. The CJEU held in von 
Colson that “sanction for unlawful discrimination … [must] guarantee real and effective judicial 
protection. … it must also have a real deterrent effect on the employer…[thus] compensation 
must … be adequate in relation to the damage sustained. [Subsequently]… national provisions 
limiting the right to compensation … to a purely nominal amount, such as, for example, the 
reimbursement of expenses incurred… would not satisfy the requirements of an effective 
transposition of the directive”131. When applied in the context of procurement, full 
compensation should entail compensation for loss of profit or chance, in addition to bid costs. 
While the gender discrimination case law does not provide all the necessary answers (e.g., 
there is no express statement that loss of chance was claimable and no substantive terms on 
conditions), this serves as an important starting point132. Express requirement of full 
compensation would indicate that participation costs for procurement breaches are definitely 
not enough – lost chance or profit also has economic value which must be compensated for. 
Furthermore, reduction of burden of proof for injured party seems the main practical way to 
increase the effectiveness of damages remedy by making it obtainable for injured parties.  
 
129 Judgement of 8 November 1990, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
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131 Judgement of 10 April 1984, Sabine von Colson & Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen. Case 14/83, 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, §§ 23 & 24.  
132 Supra note 60, CS 171&172 (S. Arrowsmith).  
 28 
 
2. Scope and essence of procurement damages remedy  
2.1. CJEU case law on procurement damages and issue of sufficiently serious breach 
As already established above, the Remedies Directives themselves do not give any 
substantive indication on what the damages remedy for procurement breaches should entail. 
Pursuant to the general EU law, the EU State liability conditions can be held applicable also in 
the field of procurement. In order to find more procurement field-specific answers, relevant 
case law in the context of procurement damages remedy must be considered.  
There are only two judgements of the CJEU (i.e., Strabag and Spijker) which contemplate 
on the substantive conditions of the procurement damages remedy. Both were delivered in 
2010, less than two months apart from each other. To this day, Strabag and Spijker have 
remained the main authority in interpreting EU requirements on procurement damages. 
However, as will be seen, the substantive contribution of aforementioned judgements has not 
been that extensive. Moreover, conciliating the CJEU in Strabag and Spijker have posed a 
challenge in practice as those decisions are somewhat contradictory. All in all, the uncertainties 
surrounding damages claims persists even after the delivery of Strabag and Spijker.  
In Strabag, the CJEU confirmed that national law cannot make the award of damages for 
procurement breaches conditional on proof of fault even if such fault of the contracting 
authority was presumed by national law133. The practical effect of this judgement is the possible 
mitigation of the injured party’s burden of proof in comparison with the general State liability 
doctrine. With Strabag, any requirement of fault is unconditionally excluded from establishing 
liability for procurement damages. By contrast, the “sufficiently serious breach” requirement 
under general State liability does not expressly exclude the possibility to rely on fault criterion 
in national law. The CJEU held in Brasserie that “certain objective and subjective factors with 
the concept of fault under a national legal system may … be relevant [to establish sufficiently 
serious breach]”. The CJEU concluded that the requirement of fault cannot be upheld under 
national law if this would impose stricter standard in comparison with the requirement of 
“sufficiently serious breach”134. It would make sense to conclude that the proof of fault element 
under State liability can otherwise be required under national law. Thus, Strabag imposes 
higher demands on procurement field than general State liability doctrine since Brasserie allows 
the Member State to rely on justification for its breach, possibility of which is expressly 
excluded under Strabag135. 
 
133 Supra note 54, § 45 (Strabag, Case C-314/09).  
134 Supra note 95, §§ 78 & 79 (Brasserie, Joined cases C-46/93 & C-48/93).  
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The scope of practical implication of Strabag judgement is arguable. On one hand, it can 
be said that Strabag has notable substantive meaning and effect. For instance, A. van Heeswijck 
goes as far as to argue that Strabag concludes that the procurement damages remedy is 
completely left under procedural autonomy of Member States136. This might be too optimistic 
interpretation as the absence of fault requirement does not in itself equate with rejection of the 
applicability of the general EU State liability conditions. If national law requirement of fault 
does not impose stricter standard than sufficiently serious breach, requirement of proof of fault 
would be consistent with State liability. This might especially be the case where national law 
presumes the existence of fault.  
Nevertheless, even if Strabag was interpreted in a more conservative way than proposed 
by A. van Heeswijck, any express interpretation of the CJEU still amounts to more than just 
guesswork based on the general EU law (e.g., general State liability doctrine) which tends to be 
relatively wide in scope. In principle, Strabag thus excludes the possibility of a contracting 
authority to argue that the requirement of fault under national law can be upheld as this is in 
compliance with the “sufficiently serious” breach requirement. The CJEU held in Strabag, that 
prohibition of fault requirement holds even if national law presumes fault of contracting 
authority and does not allow contracting authority to justify the breach137. As such possibility 
is not expressly excluded under State liability in general, Strabag is certainly a progress for the 
procurement field purposes.  
On the other hand, as R. Caranta has pointed out, this is not a significant development in 
terms of clarifying the substantive requirements behind procurement damages remedy. The 
same or, at least similar conclusion can be reached as one possible interpretation of the 
Brasserie judgement138. Furthermore, Strabag provides very little practically usable 
information and still leaves majority of the obstacles related to procurement damages 
unaddressed. For instance, while requirement of proof of fault was rejected, the CJEU did not 
elaborate on the conditions of necessary minimum standard of the breach (i.e., State liability 
and possible adjustments to it). By this line of reasoning, the Strabag decision is thus too limited 
in scope to contribute to practical effectiveness of procurement damages remedy.  
In Spijker, the CJEU held that the general State liability doctrine conditions were applicable 
to procurement damages139. The CJEU provided no procurement context specific clarifications 
nor any consideration on the practical difficulties of injured parties to provide sufficient proof 
to claim damages for procurement breaches. Consequently, Spijker was also not the much 
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hoped for development of procurement damages remedy in substantive terms either. As already 
established above, in the absence of a field-specific regulation (lex specialis), the doctrine of 
State liability would in any event apply by virtue of the general EU law. Thus, similarly to 
Strabag, the main value of Spijker rests in an express CJEU confirmation rather than in any 
substantive development on the conditions of damages remedy.  
The Spijker judgement is criticized by some for its possible counter-effective impact on the 
effectiveness of procurement damages. It holds true that the State liability doctrine might not 
be best suited for ensuring effectiveness of procurement damages remedy. Procurement 
damages are characterized by difficulties of injured party to establish the emergence, reach, 
sufficient gravity of breach and causation of such damages. Oftentimes the main damage is the 
loss of awarded contract – extent of harm caused can be measured in purely hypothetical terms. 
It is also difficult to provide sufficient evidence of infringement, gravity of breach and 
causation, as the aggrieved tenderer has usually very limited access to factual evidence. 
Furthermore, contracting authorities have wide discretion to establish award criteria making 
fulfilment of State liability conditions even more burdensome on aggrieved tenderers. National 
courts might also be discouraged to award damages for procurement breaches since, in the end, 
the compensation would come from the purse of the taxpayer and thus would be to detriment 
of general interest. This means that persons injured by procurement breaches are in a 
disproportionately weaker position to argue their case than the contracting authority.  
Significant imbalance between aggrieved tenderer and contracting authority suggests the 
need to provide additional consideration for the interests of aggrieved tender to ensure 
protection of their rights. On this point, H. Schebesta pointedly compares aggrieved tenderers 
with consumers, who must be afforded special protection due to their vulnerability140. However, 
application of State liability doctrine affords procurement damages no such consideration, 
failing to consider any specificities of public procurement field. Strict adherence to the State 
liability doctrine thus leads to the current unsurprising result of procurement damages remedy 
with little to no practical effect.  
Nonetheless, effectiveness considerations themselves are not sufficient grounds to reject 
the applicability of the State liability doctrine completely. As State liability has crystallized in 
the general EU law and consequently it cannot be reasonably expected that the CJEU would be 
willing to depart from it completely any time soon. Still, customization of State liability 
conditions to consider characteristics of procurement law, would not be completely out of line. 
As already mentioned, the CJEU has been willing to alleviate State liability to conditions for 
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the benefit of an injured person in the field of gender discrimination and employment law. Thus, 
it is not out of line to argue that relaxation of primary law conditions is possible under EU law 
for effectiveness considerations of secondary law (i.e., the Remedies Directives). Similar 
adjustments would be welcome in the field of public procurement as well since similarly to 
gender discrimination, the injured person normally has hard time providing sufficient proof of 
causation and quantification. While Spijker did not elaborate on the possibility to improve the 
position of an injured party in procurement procedure, the CJEU did also not exclude such 
possibility, leaving it open for future consideration.  
Although, the brief messages behind Strabag and Spijker taken separately are clear enough, 
their correlation has caused confusion. Some authors suggest that by virtue of Strabag, the 
interrelationship between the Remedies Directives and State liability remain unclear. At the 
heart of the debate is the question – do the Remedies Directives as lex specialis enable the lower 
threshold of a breach to establish liability as opposed to the general State liability?141  
S. Treumer for instance, concludes that while Strabag and Spijker lead to completely opposite 
results, it is left for the Member States to establish the threshold of the gravity of the breach 
required and “the dominant trend” in national laws appears to be that “any violation is 
sufficient”142. Such interpretation is consistent with the Remedies Directives and the CJEU case 
law (i.e., Strabag and Spijker), as long as the no proof requirement is upheld. The Member 
States are at liberty to impose easier standards in national laws which transpose EU law 
requirements for benefit of individuals, e.g., require only proof of breach instead of a 
sufficiently serious breach. Although such interpretation is tempting, it does not really address 
the interrelationship between Strabag and Spijker and their possible implications on minimum 
gravity of breach required under EU law.   
The discussions related to the required gravity of the breach under EU procurement law 
once again arose in legal literature with the EFTA Court saga of Fosen-Linjen. Although the 
EFTA Court applies the EEA law, its judgements can be taken into consideration for the EU 
procurement law purposes as well – the EEA legal authority on procurement is essentially the 
same as the EU one143. 
The main attraction of the two Fosen-Linjen judgements can be attributed to the fact that 
those judgements are contradictory within the most immediate sense of the word. Those 
judgements were the result of attempts of the EFTA Court to interpret the interrelationship 
between Strabag and Spijker144. In Fosen-Linjen I, the EFTA Court asserted that a “simple” 
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breach is sufficient for establishing liability for damages – there was no need to prove gravity 
of the breach145. In Fosen-Linjen II, the EFTA Court reversed its initial position and upheld the 
requirement of “sufficiently serious breach”146. The conclusion of the Fosen-Linjen II seems to 
be compliant with the CJEU practice so far. Nonetheless, the views are divided in legal 
literature as to the outcome of the Fosen-Linjen saga.  
Some authors maintain that the Fosen-Linjen I conclusion that any breach is sufficient 
should be upheld. According to R. Caranta, the requirement of “sufficiently serious” breach is 
too indeterminate, affording too much procedural autonomy “to the determent of effective 
judicial protection”147. M. A. Raimundo argues that Fosen-Linjen I amounts to a “more 
adequate understanding of the law”. This is because liability for damages is inherent to any 
system of liability of public bodies. Therefore, the need to protect the fundamental right of an 
individual to receive compensation for harmed caused by public authority should prevail over 
upholding the general State liability requirement of sufficiently serious breach. According to 
M. A. Raimundo, this is supported by the fact that in case law, the CJEU has departed from the 
requirement of “sufficiently serious” breach and has accepted “simple breach” on grounds of 
procedural autonomy of Member States148. Finally, T. Kotsonis has criticised the approach of 
Fosen-Linjen II by pointing out that strict adherence to State liability doctrine excludes all real 
considerations of effectiveness which in turn leads to problematic result149, thus suggesting 
adherence to Fosen-Linjen I.  
By contrast, others argue that the Fosen-Linjen II was the correct judgement out of the two.  
A. Sanchez-Graells considers Fosen-Linjen I as an “excessively broad interpretation of the 
Remedies Directives” and a “clear judicial excess” on part of the EFTA Court. This is because 
Fosen-Linjen I interprets the Remedies Directives to be instruments of maximum 
harmonization, while they are in fact instruments of minimum harmonization (i.e., directives 
set not all, but only the minimum requirements Member States have to comply with, thus do 
not require the transposing national laws to be identical). Furthermore, the Remedies Directives 
as an expression of secondary EU law cannot sever the link between themselves and the general 
principle of State liability. However, the latter is exactly what the conclusion of Fosen-Linjen I 
did by rejecting the applicability of the second condition of State liability. Such conclusion is 
incorrect and thus ought to be rejected150.  
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There are advantages in reading the no-fault condition established in Strabag to mean that 
any infringement (as opposed to “sufficiently serious” breach) amounts to liability for 
procurement damages151. Such interpretation would certainly benefit the injured parties (at 
minimum would reduce the burden of proof) and could be justified for effectiveness purposes. 
As matters stand now, injured parties have been essentially deprived of their right to an effective 
remedy for procurement breaches in any case where pre-contractual remedies cannot be used 
(e.g., when contract has already been concluded). Such result is contradictory to the inherent 
purpose of any remedies system and cannot thus be tacitly accepted. Consequently, the view 
which holds simple breach sufficient is understandable, as it prioritizes the general aim of the 
procurement damages remedy.  
Despite the aforementioned considerations, Strabag judgement itself cannot be read into a 
conclusion of the CJEU that simple breach is sufficient for procurement purposes. It must be 
kept in mind that Strabag merely rejected possibility of national law to require proof of fault as 
a precondition of liability for procurement damages. Prohibition to require proof of fault does 
not exclude the possibility to uphold the State liability requirement of a sufficiently serious 
breach.  
It is submitted that the scope of a “sufficiently serious” is much broader than the scope of 
fault. That is, sufficiently serious breach must be differentiated from fault despite the fact that 
there might be some overlap between them. It is probably safe to assume that if the actions of 
a Member State are culpable, the breach would be in any event “sufficiently serious”. 
Nonetheless, breaches which do not entail fault may be sufficiently serious as well. As noted 
above, the CJEU held already in Brasserie, that any fault requirement that imposes a stricter 
standard than “sufficiently serious” breach, must be rejected under general State liability. 
Regardless of whether or not Strabag refers to the applicability of State liability doctrine, no-
fault condition cannot be automatically equated with the rejection of “sufficiently serious” 
breach criterion.  
Clash between effectiveness and requirement of sufficiently serious breach has thus not 
been conclusively resolved in the procurement field. On the contrary, the sufficiently serious 
breach requirement appears to have set the standard of proof unachievably high for persons 
injured by procurement breaches rendering the remedy lacking effectiveness. Two possible 
ways are submitted here in order to aid the effectiveness of procurement damages while 
preserving the link between the Remedies Directives and the general EU law (i.e., State 
liability).  
 
151 Supra note 6, pp 160 & 161 (S.Treumer in Damages as an Effective Remedy). 
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Firstly, multiple authors argue152 that breach of EU substantive procurement rules amounts 
to “sufficiently serious” breach within the meaning of general State liability doctrine. 
According to S. L. Kaleda, breaches of procurement law suggest breaches of underlying 
principles of EU law (e.g., equal treatment and transparency). Establishing fulfilment of the 
“sufficiently serious breach” should thus be easy enough, especially in cases where Member 
States have limited procedural autonomy in determining the substantive terms of procurement 
law153. R. Caranta similarly argues that in most cases procurement breaches, are “characterized 
by very little discretion if any”154. It should be reminded that it is the discretion of Member 
States which tends to make the proof of a “sufficiently serious” breach difficult to achieve in 
practice. The inherent purpose of the “sufficiently serious” criterion is to make EU rules 
sufficiently clear so that Member States would know of unlawfulness of their activities at the 
time such activities take place155. Thus, with discretion, Member States are afforded a margin 
for error by virtue of which they can justify them being unaware of their breach. In the absence 
of such discretion however, the existence of sufficiently serious breach should be assumed – 
Member States had to know. By this line of reasoning, the burden of proof for injured parties 
would be significantly reduced – in practical terms, only proof of infringement would be 
required to fulfil the standard of sufficiently serious breach under State liability doctrine.  
Secondly, as elaborated above, the situation could be resolved by adapting the State 
liability conditions to consider the characteristics of procurement law in a similar manner as the 
CJEU has done in the field of gender discrimination. This means that in order to afford 
protection to rights of individuals and effective judicial protection, proof of infringement should 
be sufficient and if circumstances so require, the burden of proof must be reversed for the 
benefit of injured party. Thus, there is no inevitable need to rely on Strabag in order to achieve 
the applicability of the (terms of the) requirement of “simple breach” as opposed to “sufficiently 
serious breach” in procurement context. Similar conclusion can be reached by either assuming 
sufficiently serious breach for the purposes of procurement field or allowing adjustments to 
general State liability standards for effectiveness considerations.  
The argument that by virtue of Strabag, the interrelationship between the Remedies 
Directives and State liability is unclear, is unconvincing and ought to be rejected. As established 
above, Strabag cannot be interpreted as an exclusion of a “sufficiently serious” breach 
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requirement. This in turn means, that it also cannot be interpreted as an argument for the 
exclusion of applicability of the State liability doctrine.  
It is again highlighted that the CJEU never expressly excluded the applicability of State 
liability in Strabag. Interpreting Strabag as such would lead to a result which does not really 
make sense in legal terms. How would it be possible for the CJEU to tacitly (i.e., without 
express statement) exclude the applicability of primary law (i.e., general State liability) by 
virtue of secondary law (i.e., the Remedies Directives)? It is not even certain, if and to what 
extent such exclusion would be possible by express statement by the CJEU.  
All in all, so far, the case law has not made a significant contribution to the substantive 
meaning behind the EU procurement damages remedy. What is for certain is that firstly, 
damages remedy cannot be conditional upon proof of fault and secondly, that the conditions of 
general State liability doctrine have been held applicable by the CJEU. Furthermore, while the 
fulfilment of the “sufficiently serious” breach requirement might be an obstacle for aggrieved 
tenderers to claim damages for procurement breaches, it must be held applicable by virtue of 
case law of the CJEU as well. Nevertheless, it would be acceptable under EU law to assume the 
seriousness of all procurement law breaches (as breaches of substantive EU law procurement 
directives).   
 
2.2. Participation costs and loss of profit as damages: issues of causation  
The Remedies Directives do not stipulate which heads of damages must be available for 
aggrieved tenders in the event of procurement breaches. The two most obvious ones are 
participation costs and loss of profit. Litigation costs and question of interest are also relevant. 
Finally, it has also been suggested that an aggrieved tenderer could suffer reputational harm. 
However, the latter cannot be considered a priority since the mere fact that another economic 
operator has won a contract award procedure does not in itself cause reputational harm to others 
who participated in the procedure156. For the purposes of this work, participation costs and loss 
of profit are closer scrutinized because they form the substantive claim of damages for 
procurement breaches.  
Participation costs amount to direct monetary damage of an injured party – these are costs 
injured party has actually incurred. Otherwise, there would be no legal grounds to claim them 
as damages. Although, such costs are presumably much lower than the value of the contract, 
participation costs can still amount to significant sum thus providing economic operators 
incentive to claim them as damages. Considering that the Remedies Directives require the 
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availability of damages claims, it is not possible for national courts to avoid awarding damages 
for procurement breaches completely. As participation costs are objectively measurable (i.e., 
quantifiable), it is easy to see why the national courts would be willing to award them as 
damages (as opposed to loss of profit, extent of which is hard to quantify).  
Alternative perspective is to argue that participation costs should not be claimable as 
damages. As pointed out by S. L. Kaleda, participation costs can be seen as “normal economic 
risks inherent in [injured party’s] commercial activities”. Participation itself does not ensure an 
award of contract and thus cannot create a legitimate expectation for reimbursement of such 
costs157. H. Leffler argues that bid costs cannot be claimed as damages due to lack of causation. 
The purpose of awarding damages is to put an injured party into a position it would have been 
had the breach not occurred. Even in the absence of a procurement breach, the injured party 
would have borne participation costs. Thus, there is no causation between the breach and 
bearing of participation costs158.  
It is nevertheless submitted that injured parties should be entitled to claim participation 
costs as damages. Firstly, 92/13/EEC Art. 2(7) expressly foresees such possibility at least in the 
field of water, energy, transport and telecommunications (i.e., utilities) sector. Secondly, it can 
be presumed that in normal circumstances, tenderers are willing to bear such costs in exchange 
for participation in a fair and transparent procurement procedure where all participants are 
afforded an equality of opportunity. In the event of a contracting authority’s breach however, 
the procedure will no longer be fair nor transparent nor equal. Thus, participation costs would 
not serve their legitimately expected purpose and should be compensated to injured party. 
By this line of reasoning, it can be argued that any infringement should serve as legitimate 
grounds to claim participation costs as damages. However, as established above, the State 
liability doctrine affords contracting authorities some room for error, excluding the possibility 
to establish liability for any infringement under general EU law. Especially problematic would 
be to argue that contracting authority acting in good faith should compensate all bid costs in the 
event of even a minor infringement which might not have even affected the general outcome of 
the award procedure. This holds true for any heads of damage under the Remedies Directives. 
Therefore, it is presumed that no considerations of general principles of EU law such as equal 
treatment, non-discrimination or transparency are likely to overturn the margin of error left 
under “sufficiently serious breach”. It can be expected that unless expressly otherwise provided, 
claiming bid costs as damages for procurement breaches might require proof of certain gravity 
of a breach under general State liability doctrine.  
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Assuming that participation costs can be claimed as damages under the Remedies 
Directives, the minimum requirements to be fulfilled must be identified. In utilities sector, such 
conditions are stipulated in Art. 2(7) of Directive 92/13/EEC. However, the issue here is the 
absence of a similar paragraph in Directive 89/66/EEC which governs the public works sector. 
That is despite the fact that Directive 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC are otherwise pretty much 
the same in content. This difference has caused confusion.  
In utilities sector, Art. 2(7) of 92/13EEC establishes that three conditions have to be met to 
claim participation costs as damages. Firstly, proof of infringement of the public procurement 
law (i.e., the EU law itself or national law implementing the EU law). Secondly, proof that 
injured party would have had a “real chance” of winning the contract. Thirdly, infringement 
must have had an adverse effect on the chance to win. Most importantly, it can thus be 
concluded that any infringement is sufficient to claim participation costs as damages. However, 
an injured party has to be able to prove a “real chance” of winning, as well as causation between 
the breach and adverse effects on the injured party to fulfil the standard of causation.  
The question remains – can the same principles be applied on public works contracts 
despite the fact that paragraph similar to Art. 2(7) of 92/13/EEC is absent from 89/665/EEC? 
Some authors argue that the extent of damages claims should be the same under both Directives. 
Therefore, Art. 2(7) of 92/13/EEC should be expressly included in 89/665/EEC as well159. 
While such inclusion would certainly be justified and would clarify the situation in public works 
sector, the absence of such paragraph from 89/665/EEC must be considered as will of the EU 
lawmaker to differentiate between 92/13/EEC and 89/665/EEC. As similar as the Remedies 
Directives might otherwise be, there are no grounds to justify application of 92/13/EEC rules 
on 89/665/EEC situations. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that in the absence of 
special provisions in 89/665/EEC, the general State liability conditions are applicable also to 
claiming bid costs as damages.  
Despite the aforementioned, there still seems to be some understanding in legal literature 
that even under 89/665/EEC bid costs should not be subjected to the onerous burden of proof 
under State liability. In his opinion to the Spijker case, Advocate General C. Villalón reached a 
similar conclusion. He wrote that interpretation of 2007 remedies reform leads to conclusion 
that the EU lawmaker did not intend to add a paragraph such as Art. 2(7) of 92/13/EEC to 
89/665/EEC. Nevertheless, it is possible to use Art. 2(7) of 92/13/EEC in the context of 
89/665/EEC for “interpretative purposes…concerning causality and proof as regards to the 
objective damage comprising the cost of participating in the tendering procedure”. The 
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Advocate General then went on to highlight greater extent of procedural autonomy afforded to 
Member States under 89/665/EEC concerning damages as participation costs160. The procedural 
autonomy part might suggest that conditions for establishing liability for bid costs under 
89/665/EEC might stand somewhere between State liability and Art. 2(7) of 92/13/EEC 
requirements.  
While D. McGowan correctly criticizes this AG opinion as contradictory and opaque161, 
the opinion serves as (at least some) grounds for two important conclusions. Firstly, that while 
89/665/EEC affords Member States more extensive procedural autonomy, this discretion does 
not extend to exclusion of participation costs as a head of damage recoverable under 
89/665/EEC. Secondly, that under 89/665/EEC the causation and proof rules should be 
somewhat similar to those of 92/13/EEC (i.e., not equate to State liability conditions).  
Overall, there seems to be no convincing arguments against the general consensus in legal 
literature that availability of participation costs is a minimum standard of efficiency required 
under the Remedies Directives162. While in utilities sector, claiming such damages is relatively 
straightforward by virtue of Art. 2(7) of 92/13/EEC, the same cannot be said about public works 
sector. In the absence of specific rule in 89/665/EEC, it is suggested that the contents of 
92/13/EEC should still be taken as a point of reference when claiming bid costs as damages. 
Nevertheless, the injured party does not have a legitimate expectation under 89/665/EEC that 
bid costs will be awarded when conditions stipulated in Art. 2(7) of 92/13/EEC are fulfilled. 
This is because due to the absence of a similar provision from 89/665/EEC, general State 
liability rules should be held applicable by virtue of the general EU law. Thus, the national law 
seems to be at liberty to require fulfilment of higher standards than those imposed in Art. 2(7) 
of 92/13/EEC.  
In any case, compensation for bid costs should not be considered as the only available head 
of damage under the Remedies Directives. While it is not expressly clear from the Remedies 
Directives, there seems to be a general consensus that loss of profit is claimable for procurement 
breaches. However, as there is no objective or uniform method to measure the extent of loss of 
profit, awarding damages based on loss of profit has proved much more problematic in practice 
when compared with awarding participation costs as damages163.  
The requirement of the availability of loss of profit as a head of damage is a general rule 
under EU law. Already in Brasserie, the CJEU implied that loss of profit must be available for 
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EU law breaches, especially when “a total exclusion of profit would be such as to make 
reparation of damage practically impossible”164. According to the often-cited Manifredi case 
“it follows from the principle of effectiveness and the right of any individual to seek 
compensation for loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition 
that injured persons must be able to seek compensation not only for actual loss but also for loss 
of profit plus interest”165. Consequently, it can be asserted that loss of profit is claimable under 
the Remedy Directives as well by virtue of a general rule of EU law.  
Practical issues related to loss of profit arise out of a high standard of causation often 
required under national legal orders. It is reminded, that under the State liability doctrine, it is 
for the Member States to establish necessary conditions for determining causal link, provided 
that EU general principles of equivalence and effectiveness are complied with166. Consequently, 
limited guidance is available from the CJEU case law in terms of uniform EU requirements on 
causation.  
Difficulties arise because in order to claim compensation for loss of profit, the all or nothing 
approach is commonly adhered by. This means that the injured party must be able to prove that 
absent the infringement of procurement law, it would have been awarded the contract. If the 
injured party is successful, full compensation is in order. Otherwise, injured party is left with 
nothing, even no compensation for bid costs due to lack of causation (i.e., the breach had no 
effect on the position of the injured party, had there been no breach, bid costs would have been 
wasted anyways)167. In most cases, fulfilment of such standard is unachievable – procurement 
procedures usually involve more than two tenderers who are evaluated on subjective criteria, 
establishment of which is under wide discretion of contracting authority168. Therefore, proof of 
infringement does not automatically mean that aggrieved tenderer claiming damages would 
have but for breach won the contract. Furthermore, because of the lack of information available 
to the aggrieved tenderer about other unsuccessful tenderers, it will be relatively impossible to 
establish that out of all tenderers, theirs should have been successful.  
There is a general consensus in legal literature that commonly required proof of successful 
contract but for breach (i.e., conditio sine qua non), sets the standard to unachievable heights 
for most cases. According to H. Leffler for example, providing proof that tenderer’s bid should 
have been the winning bid under the award criteria of “the most economically advantageous 
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tender” is troublesome169. R. Caranta argues that the issue of causation combined with high 
standard of burden of proof is the main reason behind the lack of effectiveness of the current 
procurement damages system. As the matters currently stand, the relatively small likelihood to 
establish causation exists only for those aggrieved tenderers who have managed to reach 
procurement procedure to its final stages. This means that in the event of direct contract or 
unadvertised contract, which are considered the most severe possible infringements, 
establishing sufficient causation to claim damages is relatively unlikely170. Thus, despite the 
general consensus that loss of profit needs to be available for procurement breaches under the 
EU law, there seems to be no such factual availability under national laws. Even if the aggrieved 
tenderers were able to overcome the obstacle of proving the existence of sufficiently serious 
breach, the high standard on establishment of causation will more often than not be to their 
detriment.  
It is noted that the issue of causation has persisted during the entire existence of the EU 
procurement law. J. M. Fernández-Martín wrote already in 1997, that “it is unlikely that 
complainants can overcome the obstacle of providing a better right to the contract, especially 
with regard to those contracts awarded pursuant to the most economically advantageous 
offer…. As for the tenderers, it is a well-known fact that the supply of such evidence is an 
almost insurmountable obstacle in public procurement cases, unless the award is made on the 
basis of the lowest offer criterion. National experiences and case law on the matter largely 
supports this conclusion”171. Therefore, it is even more so concerning that the EU lawmaker 
has not acted in response to such practical issue which has been identified for a long time.  
As a solution to procurement damages lack of practical effectiveness, it has been suggested 
in legal literature that burden of proof should be either significantly reduced or reversed. 
According to A. Reich and O. Shabat, it should be for the contracting authority to prove that 
there has been no infringement. If burden of proof was to put on the contracting authority, it 
would ensure that the national court would be presented all relevant evidence thus increasing 
the probability that the outcome of court proceedings would be just172. H. Leffler also argues 
that the contracting authority should carry much higher burden of proof due to “inherent 
inequality of arms between procuring entity and tenderer”. Thus, the burden of proof must be 
for contracting authority to carry due to their better position to obtain relevant information 
(similarly to gender discrimination cases as established above). This has to be done because the 
 
169 Supra note 123, p 166 (H. Leffler).  
170 Supra note 6, pp 175 & 176 & 178 (R. Caranta in Damages as an Effective Remedy).  
171 J.M. Fernández-Martín. Damages for Breach of Community Law. Public Procurement Law Review, 1997, 5, 
pp 149 & 150.  
172 Supra note 4, p 51 (A. Reich & O. Shabat).  
 41 
current absence of functional procurement damages remedy violates the general principle of 
effectiveness as well as the Remedies Directives173.  
However, consideration must be given to the fact that procurement rules do not exist for 
the sole purpose of affording protection to the aggrieved tenderers. They also serve to protect 
the general interests174 by ensuring that the substantive procurement system is functional as a 
whole175. Interests of individual and general interests inherently contradict each other. 
Nevertheless, both interests must be considered by national lawmaker when deciding the 
required standard under which damages can be claimed for procurement breaches. The 
balancing of such interests might lead to a result which restricts the aggrieved tenderers right 
to full compensation to at least some extent.  
This might hint the underlying reason as to why successful claims of damages are rare in 
practice. When deciding whether to award damages, the national court will inevitably have to 
balance the opposing interests of general public versus individual rights. Deciding in favour of 
one would mean a decision in detriment of the other. It is also not hard to see reasons why 
national courts could be inclined to prefer overall general interests over the interests of 
individuals. After all, once the bar of successfully claiming damages is reduced, more such 
claims can be expected (i.e., result would be at least increased litigation costs for the contracting 
authority). Such development is unacceptable from the perception of general public interest as 
it would have to be financed ultimately through the purse of the taxpayer 176.  
On one hand, it can thus be argued that damages remedy serves general interest by deterring 
contracting authority from potential breaches in the future. Damages claims thereby have a 
punitive purpose which, however, is not related to the scope of actual damage caused to an 
aggrieved tenderer177. While such punitive function may be commendable and protect the 
general public from systemic infringements by contracting authority, this is not the only 
relevant consideration. It must be kept in mind that procurements are, at least for the most part, 
financed through taxpayer’s money and thus prudent and efficient use of those funds should be 
presumed. Consequently, every time a contracting authority would be required to compensate 
an aggrieved tenderer for procurement breaches, would take funds from general public. Such 
result can be considered disproportionately harmful from general interests’ perspective.  
All in all, effectiveness of damages remedy is reduced in importance, if the procurement 
remedies system was intended to put more emphasis on the protection of the EU law and thus 
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general interests. The main protection would be extended to benefit functioning of EU law in 
general. Consequently, focus would be on remedying the infringements as opposed to merely 
compensating for them178. The CJEU held already in Alcatel that the purpose of the Remedies 
Directives is to “establish effective and rapid procedures to review unlawful decisions of the 
contracting authority at a stage where infringements may still be rectified”179. This in itself 
shows the primary weight of general interests – the Remedies Directives are to enable tenderers 
fair procedure and equality of opportunity to be awarded a contract.  
On the other hand, an individual’s right to compensation for harm caused by the breach of 
EU law is crystallized in EU law180. It cannot be restricted with relying on general interests. If 
Member States could excuse breaches of EU law with public interests, EU law would likely 
lose significant amount of its practical effect. Furthermore, T. Lock argues that any damages 
claim which stands on the general State liability doctrine should be considered as an instrument 
for individual rights protection (not an instrument for EU law enforcement)181. This is because 
individual rights themselves have value which is protected under EU law. Such value would be 
diminished if individual rights were considered as a EU law enforcement mechanism.  
While there might have been some discussions in 1990s on whether or not procurement 
rules actually confer rights on individuals182, it is by now agreed that it is so. According to  
S. L. Kaleda, public procurement rules serve the primary purpose of conferring rights on 
tenderers183. H. Schebesta points out that the CJEU has held the Remedies Directives 
obligations of quick and efficient review and right of set-aside directly effective. This gives 
strong indication that the damages provision of the Remedies Directives would be directly 
effective as well (i.e., confers rights on individuals within the meaning of State liability)184.  
Therefore, effectiveness of procurement damages remedy cannot really be restricted by 
virtue of general interest considerations. General interests might solely serve as an argument 
not to make claiming damages easier than required under EU law. Furthermore, it is noted that 
under EU law damages remedy must be effective, which requires generous damages awards 
and easier standards on procedural rules in order to claim compensation for harm185. Therefore, 
the unachievable standard of causation under State liability cannot be upheld for general interest 
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consideration. Any balancing act of opposing interests cannot result in lack of effective 
damages remedy for injured individuals.  
Similar conclusion can be reached by virtue of potential third perspective. H. Leffler writes 
that the principle of effectiveness protects the EU law rule as public interest rather than the 
individual interest of an aggrieved tenderer. However, protection of individual rights of an 
injured party tends to overlap with the protection of public interest and thus “easily accessible, 
generous damages, providing both prevention and reparation” concurrently serve the interests 
of the injured party as an individual and the general interest in effective application of EU 
law186. This approach is most compliant with the idea of achieving protection of dual interests 
via the procurement remedies system. If the protection of both interests can mostly rely on the 
same remedy (i.e., generous damages awards), there would be no need to balance opposing 
interests. Nevertheless, the idea behind using generous damages as deterrence will inevitably 
have at least short-term adverse effects on public interest. Furthermore, as it is not possible to 
predict how long would it take to achieve long-term effectiveness by virtue of deterrence, the 
general interest cannot be completely left aside for the benefit of protection of individual 
interests.  
In conclusion it is noted that claiming compensation for participation costs appears to be 
relatively straightforward in practice, provided that aggrieved tenderer has actually incurred 
such costs and can provide reasonable proof thereof. This result is expected as participation 
costs should be usually quite easily quantifiable (i.e., compensated in such extent aggrieved 
tenderer is capable of proving). Nevertheless, participation costs themselves do not represent a 
major part of the harm caused by infringement. As the inherent purpose to participate in the 
award procedure is to obtain the award of the contract, the loss of the award as a result of breach 
is the harm which should be compensated for.  
However, obtaining compensation based on loss of profit is usually objectively impossible. 
This is because loss of profit is characterized by all or nothing approach according to which 
aggrieved tenderer is entitled to full compensation only if it can prove that absent the breach, it 
would have been awarded the contract. In procurement context however, fulfilling such burden 
of proof is usually impossible. Consequently, for effectiveness considerations, Member States 
might be required under EU law to offer some relief to aggrieved tenderers in terms of 
causation. One possibility could be the reversal of burden of proof in terms of causation to 
afford sufficient protection of individual rights. Another would be to take a step away from the 
traditional all or nothing approach which characterizes loss of profit as a head of damage.    
 





2.3. Loss of chance as a possible solution  
As established above, the main issue with claiming loss of profit for procurement breaches, 
is the unachievable standard of causation. According to the traditional all-or-nothing approach, 
in order to claim compensation for harm, the injured party must be able to establish that absent 
the breach, it would have been awarded the contract. In most cases of procurement breaches 
this is usually impossible.  
The aggrieved tenderers have a limited access to other unsuccessful tenders which they 
might presumably need to establish that their tender was better. Furthermore, contracting 
authorities are afforded significant discretion in determining the award criteria for choosing the 
“most economically advantageous tender”. Such criteria might include subjective elements in 
addition to objective, and in combination with discretion of contracting authority assessing 
tenders (e.g., giving points for aesthetics or previous experience), it will not usually be possible 
to establish definitively who should have been the rightful winner. This is even more so since 
often there are more than two participants in a tender. Contracting authority would be thus able 
to just argue that a third tenderer should have been a winner or that there were no compliant 
tenders at all to avoid award of damages.  
Loss of chance is appropriate to relax the standard of required causation and thus make it 
possible in practice for aggrieved tenderers to claim damages. According to the loss of chance 
doctrine, an injured party can claim damages from person whose “conduct decreased or 
eliminated the chance of a favourable outcome”. This includes the loss of chance (a result of a 
breach) to benefit from fulfilment of a contract187. Loss of chance represents an idea that 
contracts that were never performed due to a breach still have economic value. Parties injured 
by such non-performance are entitled to compensation under the full compensation doctrine. 
The idea of loss of chance has at least some international recognition. For instance, it is 
stipulated in Art. 7.4.3 § 2 of the UNIDROIT Principles 2016 (soft law)188.  
Loss of chance is an alleviation of the traditional all-or-nothing approach taken under the 
loss of profit doctrine. The idea is to afford protection in situations where objective 
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establishment for harm caused in the event of a breach cannot be objectively quantified.189. 
Result in which a person in breach would be able to escape liability solely because of the 
uncertainties surrounding the monetary scope of harm caused is unacceptable190. Loss of chance 
resolves such situation by reducing the burden of proof of the injured person (instead of certain 
win, they would have to show a chance to win). Such relaxation would be balanced by reduction 
in the sum of damages awarded – injured party would be entitled to only claim the value of the 
chance, not the expected profit of the whole contractual relationship191.  
It is often said in legal literature, that the doctrine of loss of chance was firstly established 
in the English court case Chaplin v Hicks of 1911192. In Chaplin v Hicks, the plaintiff entered 
into a newspaper contest in which a theatre manager was looking to offer twelve fixed term 
contracts for actresses. Fifty finalists (out of 6 000 participants) of the competition were chosen 
by votes of the newspaper readers who voted on pictures published of the participants. The 
plaintiff was one of the finalists, however she did not receive her invitation to final audition on 
time and consequently, was not offered an acting contract193. While she was unable to prove 
that absent the breach, she would have been one of the winners, she was still awarded damages. 
Quantification was based on mathematical likelihood of winning the contract – out of 50 
finalists competing for 12 contracts, the plaintiff had approximately 1 in 4 chance of winning 
the contract194.  
The objective inability to prove that the plaintiff would have won a contract in Chaplin v 
Hicks was because the final determination of winners was completely under discretion of the 
theatre manager. According to the facts of the case, the newspaper contained no evaluation 
criteria based on which the winners would be chosen. There appears to be no score sheet or 
ranking order either195. This means that there was no evidence plaintiff could have presented to 
establish that she would have won. The decision of the theatre manager was the standard and 
thus theatre manager could have easily rebutted any argument presented against him. Such 
subjectivity and extensive discretion are understandable in the field of acting. After all it is not 
possible to measure artistic performance on solid uniform objective standards. Nevertheless, it 
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also suggests that unless loss of chance is available as a head of damage, injured parties are 
deprived of legal protection.  
Similar considerations are relevant in the field of procurement as well. Likewise, 
contracting authorities are afforded considerable discretion when deciding on award criteria 
and the weights each award criteria carries. While procurement rules require evaluation to be 
objectively clear, this is often not the case in practice. The more unclear or ambiguous such 
criteria are, the more difficult it would be for the injured party to establish any certainty of 
winning196. As already established, such difficulties are inconsistent with EU general principle 
of effectiveness. The Remedies Directives foresee a right to claim damages for procurement 
breaches which means that the damages remedy must be factually available for aggrieved 
tenderers. Loss of chance is thus the only viable solution to ensure protection of individual 
rights as this enables to relaxation of standard to proof to achievable level.  
The prerequisites for claiming loss of chance are familiar enough – the injured party has to 
establish that there has been a lost chance, infringement and causal link between the lost chance 
and the infringement197. The proof of “lost chance” standard is considerably lower than required 
proof under loss of profit of the fact that the injured party should have won. Nevertheless, 
problems tend to arise when determining what does this “lost chance” at minimum have to 
entail and how to quantify its extent.  
The main issue with loss of chance doctrine is that it is completely hypothetical while loss 
of profit has some certainty behind it. Such certainty can be illustrated by the fact that there is 
presumably only one winner under loss of profit who can claim damages. However, under loss 
of chance, there is a risk that multiple participants argue that they had a chance to win and thus 
a right to claim damages for breach. This might be the reason why the willingness of national 
courts to apply loss of chance doctrine as something quite uncertain varies across Member 
States. Due to such uncertain nature, national courts tend to have wide discretion in determining 
the extent of a chance. Furthermore, to alleviate unforeseeable adverse effects on the 
contracting authority, the injured party must usually prove a “serious” (i.e., 50% or more) 
chance of winning to be award of damages198.  
There are a few options available for courts to measure the value of the lost chance. Firstly, 
court can establish the proportional likelihood that the injured party would have won (e.g., 
50/50), take the average of expected profit calculations provided by the aggrieved tenderer (e.g., 
100), calculate the value according to likelihood of winning (e.g., 50% likelihood, value 50 out 
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of 100) and reduce commercial risk (e.g., 25) of the tenderer from the average (50-25=25)199. 
The final sum will be the sum of damages to be awarded to the injured party. For instance, as 
will be seen, this method was used in the Harmon case200 – one of the few English cases in 
which procurement damages were awarded based on loss of chance201.  
This method is in the interests of the aggrieved tenderer because the value of loss is 
considered subjectively, from aggrieved tenderer’s point of view. Instead of giving the chance 
objective value, which is independent from the aggrieved tenderer, this method gives the chance 
value based on the aggrieved tenderer’s assessment (i.e., starting point is average of expected 
profit provided by the aggrieved tenderer). Such approach is justified since general EU law 
requires compensation to be adequate, corresponding to the actual harm suffered.  
Another way for the court would be to value the loss of chance based on criteria 
independent from the injured party. Court could determine the objective value based on the 
average market value of a similar contract during the breach of the contract202. This method 
might lead to a more just outcome from the perspective of the contracting authority because it 
excludes the possibility for the aggrieved tenderer to show the court artificially raised expected 
profit margins. Nevertheless, the aforementioned method ought to be rejected because it does 
not consider actual harm caused to aggrieved tenderer. Despite the fact that all tenderers 
compete for the same contract in an award procedure, one cannot assume that expected profit 
margins of all tenderers are the same. Even if profit margins were the same, the position of the 
aggrieved tenderer must be still considered to ensure protection of individual rights. Without 
connection to aggrieved tenderer, damages claim becomes a mere monetary sanction. This 
result is inconsistent with EU law – as established above, the Remedies Directives inter alia 
have the inherent purpose to confer rights on individuals.  
It is submitted that in order to fulfil the primary EU law effectiveness requirement, loss of 
chance should be an available head of damage for procurement breaches. Upholding solely the 
loss of profit requirement under EU law would deprive aggrieved tenderers of their right to 
effective damages remedy for procurement breaches. Contract lost due infringement must be 
held to have economic value which must be compensated if the aggrieved tenderer can at 
minimum, establish that it had a “serious” chance to win. 
  
 
199 Supra note 189, p 577 (J. L. Pryor).  
200 The High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Technology & Construction Court. Judgement of 28 
October 1999, Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v the Corporate Officer of the House of Commons, 1996 ORB 
No 1151.  
201 A. Semple. A Practical Guide to Public Procurement. Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2015, p 226. 
202 Supra note 189, p 577 (J. L. Pryor).  
 48 
3. State practice  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a few Member State examples to illustrate how has 
procurement damages remedy been brought to life by national lawmakers. After all, compliance 
with EU law can be measured on national levels only. Actual enforcement provides insight into 
shortcomings of the EU lawmaker as well. If the same EU rule has not achieved its desired 
purpose or if its effectiveness fluctuates considerably across Member States, it is indicative of 
the fact that the EU lawmaker has failed to express its will sufficiently clearly to ensure a 
functioning regulation. Analysis of Member States’ practice can help identify obstacles 
preventing the efficient enforcement of EU law.  
For those purposes, England (the UK), France and Estonia have been picked out. While 
England is at the time of writing this thesis no longer a member of EU, its practice during its 
membership is relevant and appropriate for illustrating a common law approach to EU 
procurement damages claims. France was chosen because it is often considered as a positive 
example of a national legal system which regularly awards damages for procurement breaches 
of contracting authorities203. Finally, Estonia was chosen because of my personal interest and 
the fact that there is not much literature available on the subject matter from Estonian 
perspective. For those reasons, Estonian example is given more depth in terms of analysis.  
So far, it has been established that procurement damages remedy is relatively problematic 
in substantive terms since the EU lawmaker and the CJEU have been reluctant to elaborate on 
the matter. The Remedies Directives stipulate the mere requirement that damages remedy must 
be available for persons injured by procurement breaches of the contracting authority204. This 
suggests that the matter has been left under procedural autonomy of Member States205. Because 
of procedural autonomy, a unitary approach to awarding procurement damages cannot be 
expected. However, procedural autonomy is restricted by the general principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence206. Those principles are thus yardstick to measure compliance with EU law. It 
is noted that a general consensus in legal literature is that procurement damages remedy in 
practice is not effective within any possible meaning of the word207. This is because, for most 
cases, required standards of proof are set too high for aggrieved tenderers to fulfil, making 
successful damages claims rare in practice. 
What is also known about EU conditions for claiming damages for procurement breaches, 
is that by virtue of general EU law, minimum standards for establishing the liability for damages 
 
203 Supra note 9, p 3 (H. Schebesta).  
204 Art. 2(1)(c) of Directive 89/665/EEC & Art. 2(1)(d) of 92/13/EEC.  
205 Supra note 33, § 46 (Köbler, C-224/01).  
206 Supra note 34, § 48 (Aquino, C-3/16).  
207 Supra note 8, p 1413 § 24 (Brussels Commentary).  
 49 
are those of general EU State liability. The latter was confirmed by the CJEU in Spijker208. 
Nevertheless, strict adherence to State liability doctrine has been criticized mainly because of 
the requirement of sufficiently serious breach which an aggrieved tenderer is unlikely able to 
prove209. Upholding the requirement of sufficiently serious breach thus has adverse effects on 
the practical effectiveness of damages remedy.  
Resulting Member State behaviour is interesting to observe. On one hand, Member States 
have the liberty to uphold State liability requirement since the CJEU has expressly allowed it. 
That is despite effectiveness considerations – the CJEU has not required that State liability 
conditions must be altered for procurement field purposes (which the CJEU has done for 
example in its gender discrimination law to achieve practical effect). After all, achieving the 
effectiveness of EU law cannot be left completely on Member States. EU lawmaker has the 
inherent responsibility to ensure that its will is clearly expressed and uniformly understood. If 
it fails to do so, it cannot reasonably expect of Member States the achievement of its will. 
On the other hand, adhering by standards which result in lack of EU law effectiveness is in 
itself problematic from perspective of primary EU law principle of effectiveness. The 
application of the general principle of effectiveness is undisputed. Furthermore, it is no secret 
that procurement damages remedy has very limited effect in practical terms. Such situation 
arises questions of interrelationship between State liability and principle of effectiveness which 
is not easy to answer. This is because principle of effectiveness and State liability doctrine 
should complement each other not contradict each other. The inherent idea behind State liability 
is to achieve effectiveness of EU law. The CJEU established already in Brasserie that the three 
State liability conditions “satisfy the requirements of the full effectiveness of the rules of [EU] 
law and of the effective protection of rights which those rules confer”210. As established, in 
current situation however, adherence to State liability is to detriment of effectiveness. 
Lastly, the CJEU has stated in Strabag that award of procurement damages cannot be 
conditional upon proof of fault of contracting authority even if such fault is presumed under 
national law and if the contracting authority cannot excuse its mistake211. This requirement in 
itself is relatively straightforward. In practical terms, it should not be very hard to differentiate 
between national law which is consistent with the no fault requirement from national law which 
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3.1. England  
In the UK, the lawmaker did not elaborate on the substantive details of procurement 
damages remedy when transposing the Remedies Directives into its national law (i.e., Public 
Contracts Regulations 2006). Statutory regulation for procurement damages was limited to the 
wording of the Remedies Directives and thus the conditions for the award of procurement 
damages were left for the case law to develop212. Such regulation is indicative of the UK 
lawmaker’s intention to transpose only the minimum requirements of the Remedies Directives 
into its national law. In 2017, the UK Supreme Court confirmed that in EnergySolutions, stating 
that “the [UK] legislator’s intention … [was not] to gold plate”213.  
In the UK, public procurement law breaches are considered as breaches of statutory duty 
which amount to tort liability214. The tort liability approach to procurement damages might have 
been since the English law has “no special and general rules for administrative wrongs” nor 
does it “recognize a general right to redress for maladministration”215.The nature of the 
procurement damages claims as a statutory duty which must be “fitted into one of the existing 
torts” was clearly established in Public Contracts Regulations 2006216.  
Before that, there were multiple possible actions for damages to claim compensation for 
procurement breaches. In the landmark 1999 Harmon judgement, the Court granted 
procurement damages under the heads of a breach of statutory duty (the English law, EU 
Directives and Treaty of Rome), implied contract and misfeasance in public office217, 
suggesting that all of them are possible actions for procurement damages under English law. 
Nevertheless, in subsequent case law the possibility to rely on implied contract as a cause of 
action was rejected because “the Regulations create their own regime” leaving “no room for 
the implication of any contract”. Moreover, misfeasance in public office also never gained any 
popularity since it contained a requirement of proof of “bad faith” which the aggrieved tenderers 
were usually not able to fulfil218. 
In common law system, the breach of statutory duty amounts to a private cause of action 
which is developed by case law. Public body (e.g., contracting authority) is liable for damage 
caused due to its infringement of statutory duty. The injured party must prove that a) the purpose 
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of obligation breached was to afford protection to the injured party, b) infringement and c) 
causal link219. According to P. Leyland and G. Anthony, tort liability in the UK is “another form 
of strict liability and public authorities (or other subjects to a statutory duty) will be held liable 
for damages even if they are not at fault at all”220. In those terms, the UK law was in compliance 
with the CJEU finding in Strabag that the Remedies Directives preclude national law which 
makes the award of procurement damages claim conditional upon proof of fault of the 
contracting authority221.  
Until 2017, it was understood that under English law, the contracting authority was 
responsible for procurement damages in the event of any breach (i.e., no gravity of breach 
requirement). This was because strict liability for a breach of statutory duty under the English 
law imposed no requirement of “sufficiently serious” breach (i.e., Regulation 47C of the Public 
Contracts Regulations 2006)222. The injured party only had to prove the infringement and a 
direct causal link to claim damages while contracting authority was afforded no chance to 
justify the infringement223. According to the UK Court of Appeal in EnergySolutions 2015, “the 
second Francovich condition is a more restrictive condition for liability in damages than 
prevails in English law and is therefore displaced by the national rules in the absence of EU 
rules in this area as to the determination and estimation of appropriate damages”. The Court of 
Appeal went on to hold that the UK did not intend to “gold plate” the Remedies Directives and 
thus intended to apply English law principles “to the determination and assessment of damages 
awarded” for procurement breaches224.  
In 2017, this position was reversed when the UK Supreme Court held in EnergySolutions 
that the procurement damages claims are subject to Francovich and Brasserie conditions, i.e., 
the general EU State liability doctrine. Consequently, damages claims under English law were 
also subjected under EU State liability requirement of a “sufficiently serious breach”. 
According to Supreme Court, this was precisely because of the UK’s legislator’s intention not 
to “gold plate” the Remedies Directives. Gold plating means that national law offers relief from 
conditions applicable under the EU law (i.e., relaxes the standard in the benefit of the effect of 
the EU law). It follows that if the national law was interpreted to require only “any 
infringement” in comparison with the higher standard of “sufficiently serious breach” 
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established under the EU law, it would be an instance of gold plating. As established, this was 
not the intent of the UK legislator and thus the minimum standards of the EU law (i.e., EU State 
liability) conditions had to be upheld under English law as well225.  
A decent argument can be made that the approach taken by the UK Supreme Court in 
EnergySolutions 2017 was problematic from the perspective of general EU principle of 
equivalence. It is reminded, that the principle of equivalence requires that “the procedural rules 
governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under EU law must be no less 
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions”226. In other words, if national law 
makes it easier for an individual to achieve positive effect of the EU law (as compared to the 
minimum conditions established in the EU law itself), then those more beneficial conditions 
must be upheld. In EnergySolutions 2017, the UK Supreme Court nevertheless essentially 
stated that while similar domestic actions require proof of infringement only, higher standard 
of proof is required from procurement damages claims since they are “claims based on EU 
law227”. This is because the EU law imposes a stricter minimum standard in comparison with 
minimum standard required under national law. Such conclusion is inconsistent with the 
principle of equivalence.  
R. Vornicu argues that the UK Supreme Court’s position in EnergySolutions 2017 might 
be consistent with the principle of equivalence. The conditions for measuring compliance with 
principle of equivalence are “not straightforward”, suggesting that breach of equivalence is not 
obvious. Furthermore, as the UK law did not contain any similar regulation prior to the 
transposition of the Remedies Directives, no comparison can be made for the purposes of 
equivalence. That is even more so as there also “was no general rule for compensation for 
damages caused by public bodies”228. Thus, it can be argued that the position of aggrieved 
tenderers to claim damages for procurement breaches is in fact not less favourable. That is even 
more so because the UK lawmaker wanted to afford aggrieved tenderer the minimum required 
standard of rights under the Remedies Directives.  
The aforementioned view ought to be rejected. While the Member State is afforded 
discretion to opt for enforcing EU law to minimum necessary extent, this discretion is limited 
by principle of equivalence. This means that the specific intent of a Member States’ lawmaker 
towards transposition of EU law does not definitively determine its limitations in national law. 
If national law affords better position for benefit of individuals this will extend to EU legal rule 
by virtue of equivalence. National lawmaker made their choice when implementing standards 
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for “similar domestic rules”. Thus, there should be no room to argue for the detriment of 
individuals and more favourable rules must be applied instead (i.e., requirement of any breach 
should have been sufficient as opposed to “sufficiently serious breach”).  
When it comes to heads of damages which were available for aggrieved tenderers under 
the English law, loss of profit and loss of chance were available, at least in principle229. Under 
English tort law, the aim of damages is to place the injured party into a position in which it 
would have been had the breach not taken place. This test requires comparison between the 
situation at hand and a hypothetical situation which would have been absent the breach. There 
is some disagreement under the English law as to what this hypothetical situation is which needs 
to be restored.230.  
One perspective would be to put the aggrieved tenderer into a position in which “the tender 
procedure had never occurred”. This could be justified by the fact that under private law, it is 
not possible to obligate the contracting authority to award a contract. Under this view, only bid 
costs are recoverable231. According to the mainstream opinion, the comparator could be a 
situation in which the contracting authority would have conducted award procedure which is 
compliant to procurement law. This gives rise to claim loss of profit or at least loss of chance 
as damages if the aggrieved tenderer can establish that absent the breach it would have been 
awarded the contract or at minimum, that it had a serious chance to win232. By this line of 
reasoning, the aggrieved tenderer would normally not be able to obtain compensation for 
participation costs233. This is because in the event of a lawful award procedure, the aggrieved 
tenderer would have born bid costs234.  
The central legal authority for claiming damages (i.e., loss of profit and loss of chance) for 
procurement infringements is the Harmon judgement of 1999235. In Harmon, HHJ Humphrey 
Lloyd GQ held loss of chance claimable for procurement breaches if the aggrieved tenderer is 
able to prove that it had lost a “real or substantial chance as opposed to speculative one.” 
Harmon’s chance of success but for the breach was evaluated to be at 70:30. However, “it 
remains important to distinguish between the evaluation of the loss of chance of “success” i.e., 
being awarded the contract” and the probability that the whole of the likely profit might be 
recovered”. HHJ considered 50% reduction justified due to “risks and hazards inherent in 
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construction work”. Consequently, 35% of the contract value was held to be the scope of 
damage awarded to Harmon236 Furthermore, participation costs were held recoverable237.  
The Harmon judgement as a legal authority embodies probably the most efficient 
imaginable way (i.e., loss of chance) for aggrieved tenderers to claim damages for procurement 
breaches. The requirement of “serious chance” on causation is in itself reasonable and restricts 
the liability of the contracting authority to foreseeable limits. The main issue with Harmon is 
the fact that it remained an isolated precedent of recovery for loss of chance. It is noted that in 
Harmon, several breaches of contracting authority were established, some of them quite serious. 
This might have provided the Court necessary incentive to award damages238. Subsequently, 
damages for procurement breaches were rarely awarded in the UK239 and thus, only a few cases 
of damages claims were brought each year240.  
All in all, the example of the UK in terms of efficient procurement damages claims is not 
encouraging. That is despite the fact that at least up until 2017, the theoretical framework to 
claim damages for procurement breaches in the UK was more favourable than general 
requirements of State liability – only proof of an infringement (as opposed to “sufficiently 
serious” infringement) was required to claim damages. Furthermore, Harmon judgement served 
as an authority for claiming damages based on “serious” chance to win, suggesting that the 
standard of causation required could was not unjustifiably high. In theory, English system was 
just what one could expect under EU law effectiveness considerations.  
Considering that the theoretical framework for effective damages claims was there, it is 
much more difficult to identify the reasons why in fact award of procurement damages claims 
was rare in practice. However, it is presumed that such outcome was not the result of activities 
or lack thereof of the EU lawmaker. This is because the EU lawmaker should not be able to 
definitively establish how one or the other national law quantifies damages claims and 
establishes causation – it should be left under procedural autonomy of Member States. It is 
possible that the doctrine of loss of chance is not in itself developed in the English system, 
making national courts reluctant to award damages based on it. As the loss of chance is 
inherently uncertain and completely hypothetical, there is no reasonable way the EU lawmaker 
would be able to establish the specific necessary uniform conditions to award loss of chance. 
This illustrates a deeper issue with the overall idea of awarding damages for procurement 
breaches.   
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3.2. France  
While the French system is hailed as a positive example in the context of procurement 
damages, the transposition of the Remedies Directives into the French legal system had in fact 
only a very limited effect. No special paragraphs were introduced by transposition of the 
damages remedy requirement because damages remedy for procurement breaches is recognized 
under French law since before the first Remedies Directive came to force241. Consequently, 
French administrative courts do not refer to EU law in their judgement. Nevertheless, R. 
Vornicu argues, that the system behind awarding damages for procurement breaches in France 
is unquestionably consistent with EU law requirements242. 
The French legal system has not established any specific liability for procurement field but 
relies on general French administrative law. According to N. Gabayet, it must be considered as 
“public tort law” or “public bodies’ extracontractual liability”. Public authority is liable for 
damages if injured party can prove that public authority has committed “fault” (i.e., any 
illegality), loss and causal link between illegality and loss. This holds true for any administrative 
decision thus also the decisions of contracting authorities in the context of public procurement 
procedure243. 
In terms of procurement damages, French administrative courts have developed standard 
of causation which serves as grounds for functional system of awarding damages. It balances 
protection of individual rights (i.e., aggrieved tenderers) by enabling real chance to claim 
procurement damages but concurrently offers contracting authorities protection from excessive 
litigation244. Aggrieved tenderers have been able to claim participation costs as damages in 
France since 1930s and loss of profit since 1970s245. Monti case was the turning point in which 
the Counseil d’État held that “the quashed decision to evict the bidder from the [award 
procedure] … has deprived [it] of a serious chance to win the bid. [It] has therefore a right to 
compensation, calculated on the loss of profit actually observed and not on bid costs”246. 
When deciding on the award of procurement damages, the Counseil d’État usually relies 
on the following test: “whereas the bidder is entitled to a) damages for tender costs if they can 
show that they would have had a chance of winning the contract, had the illegality not been 
committed and b) is entitled to positive damages (i.e., anticipated loss of profits) if they can 
show that they would have had a serious chance of winning the contract, had the illegality not 
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been committed”247. The scope of damages award is thus related with the likelihood of an 
aggrieved tenderer for winning the contract, but for breach. There are three possible solutions. 
Firstly, if an aggrieved tender can only prove that but for breach, it “would have not been devoid 
of a chance to win the contract”, participation costs are awarded as damages. Secondly, if an 
aggrieved tenderer fails to provide proof of “would not have been devoid of chance of winning 
the contract”, compensation will not be awarded. Finally, if there is proof of “serious chance” 
to win but for breach, compensation is awarded for “loss of potential profit”248.  
The standard of proof required for claiming bid costs as damages is set very low in France. 
An aggrieved tenderer must only be able to prove that “there was more than 0% chance of being 
awarded the contract”249. In those cases, French courts generally hold that aggrieved tenderer 
has no right to claim loss of potential profit, but do not usually elaborate much further on the 
matter. For instance, in Golf de Cognac250, it was held that 5 out of 12 chance was insufficient 
to amount to a “serious chance” and consequently, only participation costs were awarded as 
damages251.  
Bid costs in France usually means compensation for expenses an aggrieved tender has 
made to pay its employees to prepare the bid. An aggrieved tenderer therefore must provide 
evidence of how many people and for how long and for what salary worked on preparing the 
bid. Nevertheless, due to a low standard of proof required, award of bid costs in France can be 
interpreted to serve punitive function for unlawful conduct during award procedure as well. 
According to N. Gabayet, it is a “fair solution” for tenderers whose rights were breached by 
unlawful conduct of the contracting authority252. 
In order to claim “full compensation for the loss of profits” or loss of chance, an aggrieved 
tenderer must be able to prove that it had a “serious chance” to win the contract had the breach 
not taken place253. In order to establish a “serious chance”, French administrative courts 
regularly rely on their inquisitorial power to gather necessary evidence and information such as 
about “the skills and the guarantees of the bidder, the circumstances in which [it] has been 
evicted from the award of the contract, the number of bidders and the differences of prices 
between the offers”. The court then analyses bids in a similar manner as a contracting authority 
would when determining the winner of an award procedure.  
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The inquisitorial nature of French administrative procedure has been hailed as one of the 
main reasons why the French system for awarding procurement damages is functional at least 
in comparison with majority of Member States. In addition to statements and evidence provided 
by parties to the dispute, courts of France are able to gather information themselves through 
court-appointed experts and from contributions of the rapporteur public. Presumably, French 
courts have a broader and more objective perspective on the matter in comparison with courts 
who solely rely on the evidence brought by disputing parties. This might be the underlying 
reason why French courts were comfortable to develop doctrines which enable to award 
damages based on hypothetical losses254. 
This approach, while proven to be effective, is not without flaws. As N. Gabayet correctly 
argues it “runs close to the judges second-guessing [contracting authority’s] decision”255. It is 
reminded that according to settled case law of the CJEU, contracting authorities have significant 
discretion to establish award criteria256. This means that discretion to evaluate tenders according 
to award criteria is left for contracting authorities and not for national review organs. The 
purpose of review procedures is to establish whether decisions taken by the contracting 
authorities are in compliance with substantive procurement law257. In other words, review is 
directed at the outcome (decision), meaning that the court should not be able to exercise 
discretion left for contracting authorities to make such a decision. This holds true for awarding 
points based on award criteria, what is exactly what French courts seem to do in order to award 
damages for procurement breaches.  
Another problematic aspect seems to be the importance French courts tend to bestow upon 
the price of a tender when determining its probability of winning. According to N. Gabayet, 
lowest price of an offer in French case law results in “a sort of presumption of a serious chance 
in its favour”258. This might be justified with some reservations in cases where a contracting 
authority has established low price as the main criteria to determine the winner259. Low price in 
itself does not even prove that the tender was in compliance with award criteria, let alone that 
it should have won. Furthermore, in procedures where winner is determined by “the most 
economically advantageous” criteria, using price argument to assess the likelihood of chance 
might be completely inappropriate. For instance, if focus was directed on making an 
environmentally friendly purchase, a higher price can usually be expected from tenders which 
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offer a “greener” product or service. Therefore, establishing the chance to win should take into 
consideration all relevant circumstances, not only the lowest price.  
If a “serious chance” to win has been established, the French courts usually rely on 
principles established in the Guadeloupe judgement260 and award compensation “for its lost 
profit, as well as for the tender costs as long as the latter have not been covered as per agreement 
through a different and specific indemnity”261. This is completely opposite from the UK 
approach. As established above, in the UK, participation costs were reduced from award for 
loss of profit because in the event of lawful procedure, an aggrieved tenderer would have born 
bid costs anyway. According to R. Caranta, the fact that bid costs are awarded in France together 
with compensation for loss of profit results in unjust enrichment of aggrieved tenderers262. 
Nevertheless, it seems to fit with the punitive function which the French legislator has bestowed 
upon awarding compensation for bid costs in any event an aggrieved tenderer manages to prove 
that possibility to win was not completely excluded.  
Under the French system, award of damages can only be obtained if an award procedure 
has taken place, i.e., the contract has been advertised. Understandably enough, there are no 
damages in the form of participation costs if aggrieved tenderer never participated in the 
procedure. According to N. Gabayet, it would also be “impossible for potential bidder to prove” 
a chance of winning without making an offer263. In those cases, aggrieved tenderer can rely on 
the remedy of “référé précontractuel’ and “request a stay of the awarding procedure and the 
annulment of all unlawful decisions made so far”. The possibility to claim damages was not 
included under that remedy. Nevertheless, Counseil d’État held in Tropic Travaux judgement264 
that administrative courts can either annul the award procedure or award damages caused to 
aggrieved tenderer by unlawful conduct of the contracting authority265. Thus, the French case 
law has developed a way for aggrieved tender to obtain compensation for damages even if the 
procurement breach resulted in the inability of aggrieved tenderer to participate. However, in 
such cases, it would probably more beneficial for aggrieved tenderer to achieve the annulment 
of the procedure as opposed to damages claims. Award of damages in cannot be very high 
because aggrieved tenderer is in no position to convincingly argue any chance of winning the 
contract.  
 
260Counseil d’État, 18 June 2013, 249603, Groupement d’entreprises solidaires ETPO Guadeloupe, Lebnon, 
AJDA, 1676. 
261 Supra note 215, p 227 (R. Vornicu).  
262 Supra note 6, p 180 (R. Caranta in Damages as an Effective Remedy).  
263 Supra note 6, p 11 (N. Gabayet in Damages as an Effective Remedy). 
264 Counseil d’État, Assemblée, 16 July 2007, 291545, Société Tropic travaux signalisation Guadeloupe, RFDA, 
2007, p 696. 
265 Supra note 6, p 11 (N. Gabayet in Damages as an Effective Remedy). 
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All in all, damages for procurement breaches are awarded regularly in France which can 
be illustrated by an above average number of more than 4000 claims brought annually. This 
might be possible because the modern administrative case law in France has shown 
development towards the “more pro-victim approach”. It is illustrated by the fact the 
requirements on causation which are favourable from the perspective of aggrieved tenderers 
(i.e., requirement of any infringement is sufficient). Furthermore, the inquisitorial nature of 
French courts has held to be of significant contribution to regular development and use of loss 
of chance doctrine266.  
It is noted however, that the theoretical conditions for claiming damages for loss of profit 
or chance are very similar to those required under English law at least prior to 2017 i.e., any 
infringement and a “serious chance” to win. However, as established, the practical outcome of 
this theoretical framework is totally different with France hailed as a positive example and 
England criticized for the fact that Harmon remained an isolated incident in case law. The main 
difference between those two systems is the fact that firstly, French administrative courts rely 
on their inquisitorial power to obtain information relevant to deciding on the case. Secondly, 
that French courts had a history of awarding procurement damages independent from EU law 
(i.e., naturally developed in their own legal system) while procurement damages in the UK were 
introduced by the Remedies Directives.  This suggests that effectiveness of damages remedy 
comes down to cultural aspects of the legal system – the cultural understanding of whether or 
awarding damages on relatively hypothetical grounds is justified.  
Nonetheless, damages are not the preferred remedy for aggrieved tenderers in France as 
well – the expected number would otherwise be considerably higher267. This however does not 
pose a problem. It is reminded that the EU lawmaker intended to give preference to pre-
contractual remedies268. If the Remedies Directives achieve their inherent purpose, claims 
containing post-contractual remedies (i.e., damages or ineffectiveness) should in any event be 
of significantly lower number. Moreover, the “pro-victim approach” cannot absolve protection 
of the interests of contracting authority completely. Especially compensation for loss of chance 
stands on very uncertain and hypothetical grounds. In order to protect the general interests, at 
least some standard has to exist (i.e., “serious chance”) and an aggrieved tenderer should not be 
entitled to hope for such compensation in the event of any infringement. Otherwise, the risk of 
excessive litigation would arise which would be to the detriment of the interests of contracting 
authorities in terms of resources spent on litigation as well as on damages awards.  
 
266 Supra note 6, p 192 & 195 (D. Fairgrieve & F. Lichère in Damages as an Effective Remedy). 
267 Supra note 6, p 195 (D. Fairgrieve & F. Lichère in Damages as an Effective Remedy).  
268 Recital 3 of 2007/66/EC – the reform of the Remedies Directives was necessary to „ensure compliance with 
Community law, especially at a time when infringements can still be corrected“.  
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3.3. Estonia 
Under Estonian law, all procurement-specific regulation is gathered into Public 
Procurement Act (hereinafter PPA). In the context of claiming damages for procurement 
breaches, the relevance of PPA is limited because PPA regulations do not provide a cause of 
action for such claims. Moreover, as Estonian lawmaker has not transposed all requirements as 
stipulated by the CJEU, substantive conditions of national law for claiming damages for 
procurement breaches are somewhat problematic269. Subsequently, specific requirements for 
claiming damages for procurement breaches under Estonian law remain uncertain.  
While not expressly stated in PPA, it has been established in the case law of the Public 
Procurement Review Committee (hereinafter the Review Committee) that State Liability Act 
(hereinafter SLA) must be applied to determine the scope of damage and conditions for 
awarding damage270. Case law of administrative courts leads to the same conclusion271. This 
means that similarly to France, procurement breaches in Estonia rely on general administrative 
law as opposed to the English tort liability.  
The underlying idea behind Estonian state liability law is to restrict the possibility to require 
compensation for damages to foreseeable limits for the public authority and when possible, 
enable public authority to rely on other measures to remedy a breach272. It is expressed in SLA 
§ 7(1) which establishes the general right to claim damages for unlawful acts of public 
authorities. According to SLA § 7(1) “a person whose rights are violated by the unlawful 
activities of a public authority in a public law relationship may claim compensation for damage 
caused to the person if damage could not be prevented and cannot be eliminated by the 
protection or restoration of rights…”.  
The lawmaker followed this idea in procurement field and established in PPA § 185(6) that 
an economic operator can request compensation for damages only after contract has been 
awarded and economic operator had no previous opportunity to contest the decisions of the 
contracting authority. Therefore, under Estonian law, aggrieved tenderer has to be mindful not 
to postpone bringing an action for damages in order to ensure that its action would not be 
dismissed. For instance, in 2018, the Review Committee rejected a damage claim because 
aggrieved tenderer did not contest award of contract during 30-day period after it was concluded 
and brought a damage claim almost a year later instead273. 
 
269 Supra note 161, p 28 § 4 & p 1153 § 5 (M.-A. Simovart & M. Parind). 
270 Public Procurement Review Committee, Decision of 18 May 2017, 12.2-9/1848/181783 § 5.22.  
271 Supra note 161, p 1153 § 6 (M.-A. Simovart & M. Parind). 
272 T. Lember. Õigustloova aktiga tekitatud kahju hüvitamise nõue. Kehtiva regulatsiooni probleemid. Juridica, 
2010, 6, p 399. 
273 Public Procurement Review Committee, Decision of 22 June 2018, 12.2-9/11/157680 §§ 4, 14-17.  
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Under Estonian law and by virtue of SLA § 7(3) aggrieved tenderers can claim 
compensation for direct patrimonial damage (e.g., bid costs) and loss of profit. When it comes 
to compensation for bid costs, the idea is to create a financial situation in which the injured 
party would be if its rights were not violated (SLA § 8(1)). According to PPA § 217 aggrieved 
tenderer must be able to prove that firstly, contracting authority breached “provisions regulating 
organisation of public procurement” and secondly, that absent the breach, the aggrieved 
tenderer “would likely have been awarded” the contract.  
The Review Committee has only awarded compensation for bid costs once in 2013 (out of 
14 total damages claims brought before it). Review Committee reduced the amount requested 
by aggrieved tenderer by 74,4% and awarded remaining 26,6% as damages. Firstly, Review 
Committee was willing to award compensation only for such bid costs which were proven and 
reasonable. For instance, as the aggrieved tenderer was unable to explain some costs claimed 
as damages during the hearing and as there were no substantial proof thereof, compensation for 
such costs was rejected by the Review Committee. Furthermore, Review Committee noted that 
some damages calculations consisted unreasonably long periods of employee time for simple 
activities (e.g., one hour to write down a date and sign a document). Secondly, according to 
Review Committee, costs related to review procedure itself (e.g., costs of contractual 
representative) could not be considered as bid costs and thus could not be compensated for274.  
It is noted that subsequent changes of 2019 in PPA have made it easier for aggrieved 
tenderer to claim costs of contractual representative as damages. According to PPA § 198(1) 
currently in force, aggrieved tenderer is entitled to compensation for entire state fee paid for 
review proceedings and costs of the contractual representative to a reasonable and necessary 
extent if claim of damages is awarded in full. If damages are granted only partially, pursuant to 
PPA § 192(2), aggrieved tender is entitled state fee and “costs of the contractual representative 
in proportion to the granting of the request for compensation of damages”, considering 
“reasonableness and necessity” of such costs. Considering the recent amendments in law, the 
requirements for claiming bid costs as damages as stipulated by Review Committee in 2013 are 
justified. Requirement of proof of bid costs is understandable, as is expectation that aggrieved 
tenderer makes some effort to keep their expenses at reasonable extent. All in all, if the 
aforementioned case can be considered as indicative of Estonian practice for awarding damages 
for bid costs, it can be held consistent with minimum requirements established by EU law.  
When it comes to compensation for loss of profit, it is firstly noted that SLA does not 
regulate the meaning behind loss of profit but merely stipulates it as an available head of 
 
274 Public Procurement Review Committee, Decision of 27 February 2013, 12.2-9/14024, §§ 12.2-12.4. 
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damage for public authority breaches. Additionally, pursuant to SLA § 13(2) liability of a public 
authority for loss of profit is excluded when public authority manages to prove that it is not “at 
fault in causing the damage”. However, in context of procurement damages, SLA § 13(2) must 
be disapplied275 because it is directly opposite from the CJEU finding in Strabag that the 
Remedies Directives preclude national legislation which makes compensation for procurement 
damages conditional upon any proof of fault276. This also means that contracting authority 
cannot exclude its liability by proving that it was not at fault. Consequently, the SLA does not 
offer much elaboration on what are the substantive requirements of claiming loss of profit for 
procurement breaches.  
Loss of profit as a head of damage is regulated under Estonian Law of Obligations Act 
(hereinafter LOA). According to LOA § 128(4) an injured party is entitled to claim loss of profit 
(“gain which a person would have been likely to receive”) and also “loss of an opportunity to 
receive gain” (i.e., loss of chance). According to settled case law of Estonian Supreme Court, 
the injured party does not have to be able to prove the exact scope of loss of profit. Even if it is 
difficult for court to measure harm caused in financial terms, loss of profit must still be awarded 
provided its preconditions have been met. This is because as a general rule, it is not possible to 
certainly assess what would have the outcome (i.e., scope of profit) been, had the breach not 
occurred. In order to claim damages for loss of profit, the injured party thus has to prove its 
intention and possibility to receive profit277.    
While the aforementioned approach on causation would be favourable for aggrieved 
tenderers, fulfilment of a more strict standard is required in cases concerning public authorities. 
Estonian Supreme Court has held that standard of proof required in civil matters for claiming 
loss of profit is inconsistent with the essence of compensating damages under Estonian state 
liability. Consequently, in addition to proof of intention and possibility to receive profit, injured 
party is required to prove certain causal link between the breach and loss sustained278. As 
procurement damages in Estonia are awarded under SLA, one might conclude that 
aforementioned higher standard of causation is also applicable in procurement context. 
It settled in case law of the Review Committee, that in order to claim compensation for loss 
of profit or loss of chance, three cumulative conditions have to be met. Firstly, existence of a 
breach (i.e., unlawful decision, document or conduct). Secondly, only the breach established 
was the reason why contract was not awarded to aggrieved tenderer (award of contract has to 
 
275 Supra note 125, p 1156 § 16 (M.-A. Simovart & M. Parind). 
276 Supra note 54, § 45 (Strabag, Case C-314/09). 
277 Estonian Supreme Court. Civil Chamber. Judgement of 6 January 2013, 3-2-1-173-12, § 20.  
278 Estonian Supreme Court. Civil Chamber. Judgement of 30 March 2016, 3-2-1-157-15, § 13. 
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be “likely or certain”279). Thirdly, there must be a direct causal link280. Out of the 14 damages 
claims brough before the Review Committee by the time of writing this thesis, majority of them 
(i.e., 8) were rejected because failure of aggrieved tender to establish that there had been 
unlawful decision, document or conduct of the contracting authority. In four cases, damages 
were not awarded because the second requirement (i.e., only the breach established is the reason 
why contract was not awarded to aggrieved tenderer) was found unfulfilled. Only in the 
remaining two cases, aggrieved tenderer was awarded compensation for damages (once for bid 
costs and once for loss of profit)281.  
The Review Committee has only once awarded partial compensation for loss of profit in 
2018. In this decision, the Review Committee first established that conditions to claim 
procurement damages were fulfilled (breach, which amounted to only legal obstacle to 
awarding contract to aggrieved tenderer and causal link). Review Committee considered it to 
be “likely” that absent the breach, aggrieved tenderer would have been awarded the contract282. 
To quantify the scope of damages claim, the Review Committee cited case law of Estonian 
Supreme Court Civil Chamber according to which in order to award loss of profit, chance of 
obtaining the profit absent the breach must be assessed283. The Review Committee then went 
on to note that aggrieved tenderer did not provide any proof which would allow assessment on 
which part of tender could have been the profit of aggrieved tenderer. According to damages 
request, the total cost of a tender was 17 640 euros - 8200 euros of which would have been 
payment to subcontractors had the aggrieved tenderer awarded the contract. That suggests that 
the alleged loss of profit was in the extent of 9440 euros. Review Committee referred to 
previous annual report of the aggrieved tenderer according to which the annual profit of it had 
been 23 482 euros. It then concluded that “reasonable profit could not have been more than 
10% of the total costs of the tender” and awarded the aforementioned 10% as loss of profit284 
(i.e., 1764 euros). 
 Yet again, the reasoning established in the aforementioned case seems to be consistent 
with all minimum EU law requirements on procurement damages remedy. While no conclusive 
analysis can be made on the basis of one case, some conclusions are still offered. The 2018 was 
a small step forward for Estonian practice in awarding compensation for loss of profit caused 
by procurement breaching. What is more interesting, is that similarly to English and French 
law, Estonian law also appears to afford more favourable requirements (in comparison with EU 
 
279 Public Procurement Review Committee, Decision of 18 September 2014, 12.2-9/7737, §§ 7.4 & 16. 
280 Supra note 270, § 6.13 (18 May 2017, 12.2-9/1848/181783).  
281 Own statistics.  
282 Public Procurement Review Committee, Decision of 22 February 2018, 12.2-9/6394/157680, §§ 15 & 17. 
283 Estonian Supreme Court. Civil Chamber. Judgement of 21 May 2002, 3-2-1-56-02, § 21. 
284 Supra note 282, § 22 (22 February 2018, 12.2-9/6394/157680). 
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general law minimum requirements) from the viewpoint of aggrieved tenderer to request 
compensation for damages. Likewise, only the establishment of a fact of a breach was a 
necessary precondition for awarding damages. While under EU State liability proof of 
“sufficiently serious” breach would have been required, the Review Committee did not evaluate 
the gravity of a breach in any way.  
Secondly, aggrieved tenderer was able to claim compensation for loss of chance. It only 
had to prove that absent the breach, award of contract would have been “likely” which in 
substantive terms appears to be similar with the requirement of “serious chance” under French 
and English laws. By contrast, under EU State liability it can quite convincingly be claimed 
that loss of profit must be recoverable. However, loss of profit would traditionally require proof 
of certainty (i.e., absent the breach, aggrieved tenderer would have won the contract).  
While an argument can be made, that effectiveness considerations of EU law impose an 
obligation on Member States to make loss of chance available as a head of damage for the 
purposes of procurement breaches, it has no express legal authority. It stands only on one 
possible interpretation of principle of effectiveness. Consequently, any Member State which 
allows aggrieved tenderers to claim damages for loss of chance must be held to be in compliance 
with principle of effectiveness. Obviously enough, a national law (be that legal act or case law) 
which expressly stipulates the possibility for aggrieved tenderers to claim loss of chance offers 
higher protection of individual rights than guesswork based on general principles of EU law.  
Thirdly, the requirements on causation appeared to be acceptably loose in the 
aforementioned Review Committee case of 2018. Furthermore, compensation was awarded 
despite the fact that aggrieved tenderer had made no considerable effort to quantify the extent 
of harm caused. The method of determining the scope of compensation was not entirely clear 
and seemed to base on numerical values available to the Review Committee and on some sort 
of standard of “reasonableness”. The underlying idea seems to be somewhat similar to the 
English Harmon case. The Court in Harmon established the scope of award by establishing 
Harmon had 70% chance to earn profits, however, risks inherent to construction halved the 
chance resulting in 35% award. In 2018 case, Review Committee did not establish chance to 
win as a percentage, however in a similar fashion, it used exclusion method to reach final award.  
It is noted that as the value of the loss of chance is in any event relatively hypothetical, review 
bodies cannot be expected to give a specific formula to quantify the damage – it should be 
established considering the circumstances of each case.  
Despite the fact that the 2018 case of Review Committee was in itself commendable from 
perspective of EU procurement law, as of now, it remains one isolated example (not so 
differently from the English Harmon). This might be since, similarly to English law, Estonian 
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law is yet to develop its own understanding of awarding damages for loss of chance or loss of 
profit in general terms. Compensation for loss of profits or loss of chance for procurement 
breaches has not been looked upon favourably by (a few) Estonian commentators who have 
addressed the issue.  
It has been suggested in Estonian legal literature that aggrieved tenderers should be able to 
recover only direct patrimonial damage (i.e., bid costs) but not compensation for loss of profit 
or loss of chance. The main underlying argument is that PPA § 217 combined with one Estonian 
Supreme Court case, excludes the possibility to claim any other heads of damages for 
procurement breaches besides bid costs under Estonian law285. Firstly, it is because the 
possibility to claim bid costs is the only available head of damage established under PPA (lex 
specialis). This in itself suggests that the lawmaker did not intend to make any other heads of 
damages available for aggrieved tenderers for procurement breaches. In theory, there was no 
need for Estonian lawmaker to establish a legal rule for claiming compensation for bid costs. 
Hypothetically, general SLA conditions for claiming damages would have sufficed to claim 
such costs as damages. Thus, PPA § 217 might be expression of lawmaker’s will to limit 
available heads of damages to bid costs286.  
Secondly, in 2009 Administrative Law Chamber of Estonian Supreme Court rejected the 
possibility to claim loss of profit as damages for unlawful conduct of public authority287. The 
case concerned administration of city assets. A local government organization held a public 
auction to rent out city property but breached the conditions of the public auction. Supreme 
Court held that despite the breach, injured party is only entitled to direct financial damage (i.e., 
costs actually incurred by the injured party). This is because rules for administrating city assets 
gives individuals only a subjective right to demand that local government organization adheres 
to procedural rules established. However, such rules do not give individuals the power to require 
that administration of city assets would be given to them. Therefore, the purpose of the 
obligation was not to prevent loss of profit which might have occurred because of the breach of 
rules of city asset administration. Consequently, by virtue of LOA § 127(2), the injured party 
was not awarded compensation for loss of profit288. 
While the aforementioned case of 2009 was not specifically about procurement, it has been 
argued in Estonian legal literature that similar reasoning is appropriate for procurement 
purposes as well. By this line of reasoning, in the event of procurement breach, aggrieved 
 
285K. Saar. Kas Eesti riigihangete reeglid põhjustavad konkurentsimoonutusi? Hankemenetluse otsuste 
vaidlustamise probleemid. Juridica, 2014, 6, pp 428 & 429.   
286 P. Varul & Others (eds). Võlaõigusseadus I kommenteeritud väljaanne. Juura kirjastus, Tallinn, 2016, p 681 & 
ibid.  
287 Estonian Supreme Court. Administrative Law Chamber. Judgement of 22 October 2009, 3-3-1-66-09.  
288 Supra note 286, §§ 19-21 (3-3-1-66-09). 
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tenderer cannot require the award of contract to itself as a remedy. This means that the purpose 
of procurement damages remedy is not to prevent loss of profit of aggrieved tenderer but to 
ensure that contracting authority conduct would comply with procedural rules of procurement. 
This is even more so because the inherent focus of procurement procedures is on the interests 
of contracting authority – procurement procedures are conducted to enable contracting authority 
to purchase necessary product or service. In the light of this background, the aggrieved tenderer 
cannot have legitimate expectation to claim compensation for loss of profit or loss of chance 
because. Thus, the interests of contracting authority prevail over individual interests of the 
tenderers and aggrieved tenderers would have to settle for reasonable participation costs, extent 
of which they are able to prove289.  
The aforementioned approach is understandable from perspective of Estonian 
administrative law. As already mentioned above, Estonian state liability is built on around the 
idea that compensation for damages is a remedy of last instance. Injured party is only entitled 
to compensation for damages under Estonian state liability if there is no other possibility to 
remedy the harm and if public authority is at fault. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that 
public procurement rules are not completely up for Estonian legislator to make. It is inherent in 
general EU law that compensation for damages includes loss of profit. There is little 
controversy in legal literature concerning public procurement from EU perspective that loss of 
profit must be compensated for. Consequently, any view which restricts the possibility to 
compensate loss of profit for procurement damages under the Remedies Directives ought to be 
rejected.  
All in all, it can be concluded that while the Estonian lawmaker has not expressly stated all 
substantive requirements of claiming damages for procurement breaches, effective framework 
might theoretically exist. Similarly, to France and England, there is no requirement to prove 
gravity of breach and loss of chance is available as a head of damage. While Estonian law relies 
on SLA to compensate for procurement damages which contains a regulation contrary to 
Strabag judgement (i.e., no requirement to compensate loss of profit if absence of fault is 
proven), it has not raised any practical issues. Similarly, to England, the absence of regular 
practice of awarding damages for procurement breaches is probably related to cultural legal 
background reasons. Furthermore, similarly to England, Estonian review procedures do not 
involve extensive use of inquisitorial powers of review body, which has been considered as one 
of the main reasons behind the effectiveness of the French system.   
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Conclusions  
This work was motivated by lack of effective procurement damages remedy for 
procurement breaches by contracting authority under EU law. That is despite the fact that EU 
lawmaker has highly harmonized substantive procurement law on EU level. Furthermore, EU 
lawmaker has required the availability of damages remedy for procurement breaches to afford 
protection of functionality of substantive EU procurement system as a whole and individual 
rights protection of aggrieved tenderers. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus in legal 
literature that EU damages remedy for procurement breaches can hardly be considered 
effective.  
The problematic aspect with EU damages remedy is the fact that the Remedies Directives 
do not establish any substantive conditions of the damages remedy – merely a requirement, that 
damages remedy must be available - is established. Such lack of regulation has caused 
confusion and legal uncertainty. It can be interpreted as a will of EU lawmaker to leave 
substantive conditions completely under procedural autonomy of Member States. To some 
extent, it is true – EU lawmaker cannot establish the exact way how all national courts award 
damages for breaches. However, the fact that Remedies Directives themselves do not address 
the issue, does not mean that EU law imposes no additional requirements on the procurement 
damages remedy (besides the requirement of availability).  
The objective of this work was to establish the minimum conditions required under EU law 
to achieve the minimum achievement of the will of EU lawmaker, i.e., minimum standard of 
required effectiveness of procurement damages remedy. Due to absence of specific EU 
legislation, the starting point in determining the minimum requirements of the EU law was the 
primary EU law. It was assumed from the start that award of damages, like any remedy, must 
achieve some minimum standard of effectiveness so it could be considered compliant. If 
damages remedy had no practical effect behind it, it would amount to mere words of legislator 
which clearly cannot carry inherent purpose of law.  
Firstly, it was established that according to settled case law of the CJEU, if EU lawmaker 
has not regulated specific issue under governance of EU, it is for the Member States to ensure 
that the effect of the EU law would be achieved (i.e., procedural autonomy). This discretion is 
restricted by principles of equivalence (i.e., if similar domestic actions are given better 
procedural position than those required under EU law, actions based on EU law must be 
afforded the better procedural position as well) and effectiveness (i.e., domestic law cannot 
make it excessively difficult or impossible to achieve protection of rights conferred upon 
individuals by EU law or requirement for Member States to achieve full force and effect of EU 
law). At times, the CJEU has also referred to principle of judicial protection which governs the 
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rights of individuals to effective remedy and fair trial. It is not certain if principle of effective 
judicial protection is an expression of principle of effectiveness or should it be strictly 
differentiated from principle of effectiveness. However, as long as substantive conditions of 
principle of effective judicial protection are ensured, it has no practical significance for the 
purposes of this work whether it is part of principle of effectiveness or a separate concept.  
The possibility for individuals to claim damages for EU law breaches from Member States 
is inherent to the system of the EU. General State liability doctrine founds a direct right based 
on EU law to claim damages, provided that Francovich State liability conditions are fulfilled. 
Injured party is entitled to compensation for damages if a) Member States breached a rule which 
intended to confer rights on the individuals, b) breach was sufficiently serious and c) there is a 
direct causal link between breach and harm caused to the individual. As EU procurement law 
has not established any other standard of liability for EU procurement law breaches, State 
liability is applicable by virtue of general EU to procurement field as well.  
The fulfilment of first condition of State liability (i.e., EU rule confers rights on 
individuals) is not that problematic under procurement law. While all contracting authorities 
are not Member States, it has been established in case law of CJEU that the notion of a State 
must be interpreted broadly for purposes of State liability. Establishing that contracting 
authority can fulfil the criteria of a “State” under State liability is not very controversial. 
Furthermore, the inherent purpose of the Remedies Directives is to confer rights on aggrieved 
tenderers to inter alia obtain relief for procurement breaches. Therefore, the first condition of 
State liability does not usually pose a challenge for practical terms.  
The requirement of proof of “sufficiently serious” breach under the second condition of 
State liability is however slightly problematic. This is because Member States are afforded room 
for error and discretion under “sufficiently serious” breach requirement. Consequently, national 
courts seem to be reluctant to hold “sufficiently serious” breach if the breach of a Member State 
is not obvious (i.e., in a matter in which Member States had no discretion or very limited 
discretion). Procurement procedures are characterized by relatively wide discretion of 
contracting authorities which makes the fulfilment of the requirement of “sufficiently serious” 
breach potentially burdensome for aggrieved tenderers.  
Thirdly, direct causal link between loss and breach must be established. The conditions for 
causation have been generally left for Member States to establish. This might assumably be be 
problematic in the context of procurement damages as well. Considering that the purpose of 
participation in award procedure is to win the contract, the most obvious potential harm 
resulting from breach would be the loss of contract. However, proving certainty that but for 
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breach the aggrieved tenderer would have been awarded the contract appears to be objectively 
unachievable for most cases even in abstract terms.  
Application of general State liability requirements might potentially result the lack of 
practical effectiveness of procurement damages remedy. If the required standard of proof is 
objectively set too high for most cases, aggrieved tenderers will not be able to claim 
compensation for damages and are thus deprived of their right to claim compensation for harm. 
Consequently, the question of interrelationship between general principle of effectiveness and 
State liability arises. This is not an easy one to answer because the inherent purpose of State 
liability is to complement the effectiveness of EU law. However, in field such as procurement, 
question arises if it is possible to adjust State liability for effectiveness considerations?  
The CJEU has affirmed such possibility in the field of gender equality and employment 
law. Similarly to procurement law, protection of fundamental EU rights of non-discrimination 
and equal chance of opportunity is at the heart of gender equality law. Furthermore, contracting 
authorities and employers are afforded considerable discretion and subjectivity on whom to 
choose amongst multiple candidates. It is relatively easy to hide discrimination behind such 
wide margin of appreciation. The injured parties in both gender discrimination and procurement 
breach cases are on disproportionately weaker positions. They usually have very little access to 
factual information or evidence about other candidates or conduct of employer or contracting 
authority. This is in addition to the fact that proving breach of discretion is in itself an onerous 
task.  
In the field of gender discrimination, the CJEU has consequently held that in order to afford 
protection of individual rights, any breach is sufficient to found a right to damages. 
Furthermore, if circumstances so necessitate, the burden of proof will be reversed for the benefit 
of the employee. As for heads of damages, full compensation is in order, that is direct costs, 
loss of profit, interest. Furthermore, compensation must be adequate and correspond to harm 
caused – Member State is not at liberty to impose limits on damages award which deprive party 
injured by gender discrimination from entitlement to full compensation. Due to inherent 
similarities in purposes of procurement and gender equality law and similar difficulties in 
providing proof of breach and causation, similar approach is justified for purposes of 
procurement breaches to afford protection of rights of aggrieved tenderers.  
The CJEU has not elaborated on the possibility to relax State liability standard for 
procurement law purposes (in a similar manner as gender equality law). When it comes to case 
law of the CJEU concerning procurement damages, there are only two judgement from 2010 – 
Strabag and Spijker. According to Strabag, the Remedies Directives preclude national 
legislation which makes the award of damages conditional upon proof of fault even if fault of 
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contracting authority is presumed under national law. According to Spijker, general State 
liability conditions are applied to establish liability for procurement damages. Some authors 
consider those judgements to be contradictory and confusing. The main problem with Strabag 
and Spijker is the fact that they do not contained any much hoped for developments in terms of 
substantive conditions on procurement damages. What can thus be established this far is that 
State liability conditions are applicable for establishing liability for procurement damages, 
however there can be no requirement of proof of fault.  
When it comes to available heads of damages under EU law, the substantive damages claim 
can be comprised of direct monetary damage (i.e., bid costs) and loss of profit. Compensation 
for bid costs is relatively straightforward since they are objectively quantifiable. Directive 
92/13/EEC for utilities sector establishes a specific condition to claim participation costs for 
damages – aggrieved tenderer has to show it had a chance to win and that chance was adversely 
affected by breach of contracting authority. While there is no similar paragraph in public works 
directive 89/665/EEC, it is generally understood that participation costs can still be claimed as 
damages. However, while conditions 92/13/EEC are obviously directly applicable to 
89/665/EEC, it is submitted that it is possible to rely on them for guidance. Consequently, 
conditions for claiming participation costs under 89/665/EEC should remain somewhere 
between general State liability and 92/13/EEC.  
It is generally agreed that loss of profit as a head of damages is available for persons injured 
by breaches of EU law. In procurement purposes, loss of profit embodies compensation for 
actual harm caused to aggrieved contract – the loss of contract. However, claiming 
compensation for loss of profit in procurement fields is presumably problematic because of 
traditional all-or-nothing approach of award damages based on loss of profit. Aggrieved 
tenderer would usually be required to prove that in addition to the breach, it would have been 
awarded the contract had procedure been conducted lawfully. If aggrieved tenderer manages to 
provide required proof, it will be entitled to full compensation. If not, no damages are awarded, 
not even bid costs because in the event of lawful procedure, aggrieved tenderer had to bear bid 
costs anyways.  
It is easy to see objective difficulties for aggrieved tenderer to prove certainty that their 
tender was the best amongst other tenders they usually know very little about. Furthermore, it 
is hard to imagine how to convincingly argue that contracting authority has exceeded its 
discretion if breach is not obvious. Thus, mere availability of loss of profit is inconsistent with 
principle of effectiveness since it will not offer aggrieved tenderers actual possibility to obtain 
compensation for harm caused by loss of contract.  
 71 
In order to ensure minimum effective protection of aggrieved tenderer’s rights, they must 
be able to claim loss of chance. Under loss of chance doctrine, the injured party must prove that 
they had a serious chance to win the contract absent the breach. Compensation is consequently 
awarded based on the likelihood injured party had to win the contract. This option would 
balance the dual interests of procurement damages remedy. Firstly, it would serve as deterrence 
because contracting authorities would be aware that compensation for damages might actually 
be awarded for procurement breaches. The purse of the taxpayer would be protected from 
excessive litigation by the “serious chance” requirement, in addition to fact that only part of 
expected profit is compensable under loss of chance. Secondly, individual rights would be 
protected since it is considerably more likely that aggrieved tenderer will be able to establish 
“serious chance” as opposed to “certain chance”.  
Thus, it is presumed that in order for procurement damages to be effective, aggrieved 
tenderer must be able to claim it for any breach and bid costs and loss of chance should be 
compensable. To illustrate the latter this work gave a general comparison between the systems 
of England, France and Estonia. England was chosen due to its common law legal system. 
France because it is generally exemplified in legal literature as a positive example of a system 
with regular award of damages claims. Finally, Estonia was chosen because of my personal 
interest and scarcity of literature from Estonian perspective.  
Surprisingly, all legal systems were relatively similar from theoretical point of view. In all 
jurisdictions, national law settled for establishment of breach and did not require proof of 
“sufficiently serious breach” (although England changed that perspective in 2017, possibly 
resulting in breach of principle of equivalence). Participation costs were compensated for only 
in France and Estonia, but not in England due to understanding that participation costs are 
inherent commercial risks of tenderer. As tenderers must bear bid costs in the event of lawful 
award procedures as well, they do not have legitimate expectation for their compensation.  
Theoretical possibility to award compensation for loss of chance if there had been a 
“serious chance” to win a contract was available in all jurisdictions. In France, awards for loss 
of chance are regular which is illustrated by a relatively high number (approximately 4000) 
annually brought damages claims. By contrast, award of loss of chance in Britain (i.e., Harmon) 
and Estonia were isolated cases. Average number of annually brought damages claims thus 
remained unsurprisingly low in both jurisdictions.  
The secret behind success of the French system is considered the inquisitorial power of 
French administrative courts which is regularly used in procurement damages cases as well. 
There is nothing similar to match under Estonian or England law. Courts mainly rely on 
evidence and information brought by disputing parties.  
 72 
What the analysis of selected Member States indicates is that the issue of procurement 
damages is probably much deeper than the lack of uniform set of rules on EU level (as initially 
presumed). Instead of EU regulation, the reason behind lack of practical effectiveness of 
procurement damages remedy might be attributed to cultural differences in legal background. 
The French system developed the compensation for loss of chance for procurement breaches 
independently from EU system (loss of profit for procurement breaches is awarded since 1970s, 
first Remedies Directives was introduced in 1989). In England, procurement damages remedy 
was introduced with transposition of Remedies Directives. In Estonia, while the general state 
liability law foresees the possibility to claim loss of profit for harm caused by public authority, 
it must be remembered that underlying idea of Estonian state liability law is to award damages 
only as a remedy of last resort. That is why courts might not be so forthcoming in award loss 
of profit – similarly to England, the doctrine is yet to develop under Estonian law.  
Effectiveness of EU procurement damages remedy might still increase in practical value if 
the EU lawmaker would be inclined to assert some specific substantive requirements on such 
damages claim. However, as is seen, due to different legal backgrounds and procedural 
autonomy of Member States, even result in terms of effectiveness of procurement damages 
remedy can probably not be expected any time soon. Any development in this field would be 
welcome as procurement damages remedy remains at the heart of effectiveness of procurement 
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